How to counter the Houthi threat at sea

Despite a desire to focus on China, the Biden administration’s national security team has been pulled back to the Middle East ever since the Oct. 7 Hamas attacks on Israel. In this new op-ed, Bilal Saab and Kevin Donegan of the Middle East Institute argue for a series of steps from the White House and Pentagon to secure global waterways against the threat of Houthi militants.

The Biden administration has largely relied on airstrikes to prevent the Houthis from causing further harm to international maritime trade in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. But as we have seen already, this approach is unlikely to work against an armed group that has survived years of such one-off attacks from above. To effectively degrade the military capacity of the Houthis, a comprehensive and fully-resourced interdiction regime at sea is needed to target their supply lines and deny them the use of various forms of Iranian assistance.

Even though the Houthis have stated that their attacks are in response to Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza, their violence cements their political control in northern Yemen. It is also consistent with Iranian efforts to achieve regional primacy. So, those attacks are likely to continue, regardless of what happens in Gaza; after all, they were occurring, albeit with less frequency, before the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas kicked off the latest regional conflict.

Let’s be clear on the stakes: For the first time in four decades, a core US interest in the region on which successive American presidents have based US Middle East policy — freedom of navigation and the free flow of commerce — is at risk. By enabling the Houthis in Yemen to attack international vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden with armed drones and sophisticated anti-ship missiles — or in one notable case last year, hijack an entire vessel — Iran, as it did in the Gulf in the late 1980s, is causing tremendous harm to commercial activity in one of the world’s most crucial waterways.

The Houthi attacks have upended global trade and forced many ships to avoid Egypt’s Suez Canal, a vital route for energy and cargo travelling from Asia and the Middle East to Europe. So far, the impact on the oil market is greater for Europe and economically vulnerable nations than it is for the United States, but should the Houthi attacks cause a major supply disruption, there could be serious risks to oil flows and the prices could spike quickly, reigniting inflationary pressures and affecting the US economy.

Certainly, the US has made efforts to counter the threats. The United States has interdicted some ships carrying arms to the Houthis, as the US Fifth Fleet highlighted in March 2023, but those efforts are more ad-hoc and have not been properly resourced. It’s time for something more cohesive.

To neutralize the Houthi threat, President Biden should task US Central Command (CENTCOM) with leading an interagency effort to deny the Houthis the means and capability to attack the free flow of commerce in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. This effort should include countering the ability of the Houthis to be resupplied/rearmed by Iran, or other organizations, with weapons and weapons components that can be used to attack international vessels; and denying the Houthis the use of Iranian training, intelligence, targeting information, or other means that can be used to restrict the free flow of commerce.

A broad-based interdiction regime must be resourced with the necessary Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, US Air Force squadrons (plus tanking), and fusion cells along with the ships, aircraft, and other task-specific units required to achieve the above objectives. That likely means pulling jets from the Indo-Pacific, which goes against the focus on “Great Power Competition” the Pentagon is pushing, but the realities of today in the Gulf need to take precedence over posturing for a Chinese conflict that all hope is far in the future.

The US Navy also should be provided additional funding, even if temporarily, to procure more Task Force 59 unmanned surveillance vessels surveillance assets that could enhance an existing operation that already watches over 10,000 square miles of water space on a persistent basis. Again, this may require taking assets from elsewhere in the globe; while far from ideal, the region needs securing now and should take precedence over other taskings.

There are non-materiel moves Biden can, and should order. Operation Prosperity Guardian is an important first step to seek support from international allies and partners. But a parallel international task force must be formed to execute the above-proposed interdiction mission at sea. The command structure already exists within the Combined Maritime Forces and US Naval Forces Central Command Headquarters.

And perhaps the most important, and impactful, move Biden could make is to provide the US 5th Fleet Commander with the authorities to conduct “collective self-defense” of any vessel that is US-flagged, US-owned, US-operated, has American crew members, or that is carrying any cargo transiting to or from the United States. In addition, the 5th Fleet Commander must be authorized to defend any other ship that requests US defense for transit of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

Last but not least, the existing United National Verification Inspection Mechanism (UNVIM) regime must be overhauled. This regime was supposed to inspect material flowing to Yemen, typically in Djibouti, but it is vastly ineffective. Hardly any items have been confiscated through UNVIM in years. The Department of Defense and the Department of State should collaborate with Arab partners and European allies to generate a new, enduring verification mechanism outside of UNVIM, one that has teeth (accountability), is not susceptible to corruption, and that has appropriate authorities to prevent the flow of lethal aid into Yemen.

An almost exclusive reliance on US air power is unlikely to effectively address the Houthi threat to international maritime trade. All Iran has to do, which it has done for years, is resupply its Houthi allies every time they are targeted.

Ultimately, the Houthi supply lines are of greater importance to their existing capabilities than a few fighters who get taken off the board. If they are not part of the US response, then a specially designated global terrorist group, according to the State Department, will be allowed to hold the global supply chain hostage whenever it chooses.

Bilal Y. Saab is Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Institute (MEI)’s Defense and Security Program. Vice Admiral Kevin Donegan (US Navy, ret.) is a distinguished senior fellow at MEI and a former commander of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet.