Rise and Growing Threat of Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan

Rise and Growing Threat of Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan

Executive Summary

• Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) is emerging as a serious militant threat, with the potential to rival Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The alliance has integrated fragmented jihadist factions, incorporated drone technology, developed a more sophisticated media narrative, and carried out coordinated attacks targeting state security forces.
• Beyond kinetic operations, IMP is adapting its propaganda by combining jihadist, anti-Western, and nationalist themes. This hybrid ideological narrative frames violence in moral and political terms, seeks to enhance recruitment, and aims to cultivate local support, including among economically stable segments of the population.
• IMP’s emerging operational capabilities, cross-border linkages, growing rivalry with TTP, and reported coordination with Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Baloch insurgent groups point to a dangerous shift in Pakistan’s militant landscape.

Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP)—an alliance comprising the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HGBG), Harakat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (HIIP), and Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI)—has significantly altered Pakistan’s militant landscape, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Since its formation on April 11, 2025, IMP has evolved into an umbrella alliance, rather than functioning as a distinct organization. It includes fragmented militant factions that coordinate operations, share intelligence, run organized digital campaigns, publish propaganda, and use drones alongside kinetic attacks against state security forces (X/@Sameer1249134, June 28).

HGBG is the most experienced and dominant faction among the groups under IMP’s umbrella. The group is directly associated with Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who is regarded as more dangerous than Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, or “Pakistani Taliban”) chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud. Bahadur is known to be particularly capable of conducting high-profile operations, coordinating with allied groups for intelligence sharing, and sustaining influence. One prominent Pakistani security analyst argued that Bahadur is Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud’s “master” in militant tactics and is far more dangerous (X/@AbdullahKhan333, June 30). The formation of IMP has further expanded Bahadur’s influence, operational reach, and organizational infrastructure in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and adjacent borderlands.

Ideology and Operations

IMP’s rhetoric deliberately combines anti-Western sentiment, nationalist framing, and jihadist ideology to create a more nuanced and effective narrative for organizational and operational purposes. Media accounts affiliated with the group’s factions, particularly Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan, have actively published materials and updated audiences on IMP’s activities. Posts frequently include footage of attacks, fighter training, preparatory sessions, and audio and video speeches by key figures on Islamist, jihadist, and insurgent themes (X/@IIP_media1, June 13). Despite its broader anti-Western rhetoric, IMP appears to avoid recruiting foreign jihadist elements or openly aligning with transnational militant groups. This approach may reflect an understanding with the Afghan Taliban, which remains sensitive to cross-border outreach by other militant groups.

IMP has also displayed increasingly sophisticated operational capabilities, combining integrated attacks with the dissemination of insurgent propaganda. In the first half of 2026, the group has adopted a more organized and calculated strategy to target security forces. This involved improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, rocket fire, sniper shootings, assaults on checkpoints, ambushes of security convoys, and quadcopter drone attacks (X/@PakistanPulse_N; X/@SalahddinA10994, June 28).

The group often incorporates drone-enabled attacks into its kinetic operations to gain tactical advantages against poorly equipped security forces. These drones are modified to carry and drop small explosive payloads and grenades on checkpoints and security vehicles, enabling more precise attacks. This adaptation reflects a broader regional trend in militant warfare (X/@PakistanPulse_N, June 17).

The screenshot shows an IMP claim of a quadcopter drone attack on a security checkpoint in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, in which one security personnel was reportedly killed, and the checkpoint was partially damaged.

In July 2025, IMP claimed more than 90 militant attacks against security forces across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Reports also suggest that June 2025 alone witnessed a sharp rise in militant attacks and counterterrorism operations by security forces. HGBG was the leading militant faction carrying out fatal attacks against security personnel. HGBG currently operates four suicide camps, with allied IMP factions also providing manpower to intensify attacks and expand militant influence (Khorasan Diary, January 8). Operations in 2026 have so far signaled a continuation in these trends. Most attacks carried out and claimed by IMP involve suicide bombers, coordinated armed fighters, drone use, and engagement tactics, including the following:

• On June 28, HGBG carried out a suicide attack in Mir Ali that killed 13 security personnel and wounded 29 others (Dawn News, June 28).
• On May 10,  IMP released an infographic report on its 10 days of operations from April 28 to May 8, claiming that 48 security personnel were killed and 34 injured. IMP also claimed to have destroyed three security posts, three military vehicles, and one solar system in these attacks (X/@PakistanPulse_N, May 10).
• On May 19,  IMP released another infographic report on its 10 days of operational activity from May 9 to May 18, claiming that 60 security personnel were killed and 25 injured (X/@PakistanPulse_N, May 19). This report also referred to an attack on a police station in Bannu, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in which more than 15 policemen were killed (Express Tribune, May 10).

Narratives and Digital Warfare

IMP is not focused solely on the kinetic front. It is also active on the digital front, where it seeks to target opponents, disseminate propaganda, strengthen its narrative, and achieve psychological superiority through a sophisticated media apparatus. Many social media accounts affiliated with IMP and its sub-factions—including Lashkar-e-Islam, Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan, and HGBG—actively post, share, and amplify examples of the group’s ideology,  attacks, speeches, and publications.

In May, Inqilab-e-Islami media, affiliated with Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan, shared a manifesto-style pamphlet aimed at reaching a broader audience. IMP’s core ideology and narrative strongly condemn the West and depict Pakistan’s army as an enemy. The pamphlet blends militant and jihadist discourse with anti-imperialism, nationalism, and populism, portraying Pakistan as a slave of the West and presenting a three-part ideological strategy to overcome the existing crisis: invitation, training, and armed jihad (X/@IIP_Media1, May 21). The document frames the group’s militant activities in moral terms and seeks to justify violence.

The pamphlet also portrays the movement as a morally disciplined force, friendly to local populations, and a true ideological descendant of Indian Islamic revivalist and jihadist figures. These figures include Syed Ahmad Shaheed, an anti-colonial activist and prominent Deobandi; Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind leader Maulana Mahmud Hasan Deobandi (alias Sheikh-ul-Hind); and the Afghan Taliban’s first supreme leader, Mullah Muhammad Omar. The pamphlet further presents the group’s goal as the establishment of an Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. Such a narrative combines homeland nationalism in Pakistan with themes of sacrifice, martyrdom, and Islamic sharia, drawing heavily from the Afghan Taliban’s narrative of jihad and Islamism.

Friction within TTP

Pakistan’s militant landscape is also being reshaped by emerging tensions among fragmented TTP factions. IMP’s role and significance have grown as fissures within TTP became more visible. On May 20, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar’s Umati group clashed with Kazim—TTP’s local commander in Kurram—resulting in the deaths of around 18 Jamaat-ul-Ahrar militants, including Commander Mumtaz. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar’s leadership had already blamed Mufti Noor Wali for involvement in the August 2022 assassination of Jamaat-ul-Ahrar leader Abdul Wali, also known as Omar Khalid Khorasani, in Barmal district, Paktika (BBC Urdu Service, May 22, 2022).

The latest episode in Kurram further damaged relations between TTP and Jamaat-ul-Ahrar. The latter instructed its fighters not to trust TTP and has moved closer to IMP. There is now a possibility that Jamaat-ul-Ahrar could join the IMP alliance. If this occurs, TTP could lose significant influence in Pakistan, while existing friction among militant groups could increase localized violence over influence, recruitment, resources, and dominance. 

Conclusion

The emergence of IMP reveals a more lethal transformation in Pakistan’s militant landscape. Militancy has become increasingly decentralized, and actors adapt drone technology and digital media in more sophisticated ways. IMP has moved beyond conventional insurgent patterns and is developing into a hybrid militant network capable of challenging state authority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s conflict-affected areas. In this context, IMP is gaining importance as a trusted alliance for fragmented and disgruntled TTP factions, enabling the group to expand its militant network, influence, and control in volatile areas of the province and beyond.