At a press conference on July 31, Kazakhstan’s First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar revealed that China will build Kazakhstan’s third nuclear power plant, further deepening Beijing’s growing influence over the Central Asian country’s nuclear future.
“The third plant (like the second one) will also come from China,” Sklyar said, responding to a question from an RFE/RL journalist. “Our colleagues from the relevant agency are currently working on this matter.”
The announcement follows an earlier June decision to award the second plant to China’s state-run China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), just one day before President Xi Jinping visited Astana for the China–Central Asia summit.
China Rises, Russia Lingers
While Kazakhstan formally awarded the symbolic “first” nuclear power plant project to Russia’s Rosatom in June, it now appears Astana is strategically dividing its nuclear infrastructure among major powers. This move, a demonstration of Kazakhstan’s strategic foresight, is widely seen as a geopolitical balancing act: maintaining ties with Moscow while pivoting toward Beijing as a more reliable and less sanctioned partner.
“China is definitely one of the countries that has all the necessary technologies and the entire industrial base,” said Almasadam Satqaliev, chairman of Kazakhstan’s Atomic Energy Agency, during a June 15 announcement.
The contrast between the two projects is stark. While Rosatom remains tasked with building Kazakhstan’s first nuclear plant, slated for completion by 2035 or later, it is heavily reliant on Russian export financing, which remains uncertain amid the Kremlin’s ongoing war in Ukraine and deepening fiscal pressures and sanctions.
“Work on the issue of attracting state export financing at the expense of the Russian Federation has begun,” the Kazakh government said in a statement in June.
Kazakh lawmaker Ermurat Bapi told RFE/RL that “CNNC is backed by China’s robust industrial base, ample funding, and, most importantly, freedom from Western sanctions, making it a far more practical and politically safer partner for our country.”
“This choice reassures us about the practicality and safety of Kazakhstan’s nuclear future,” Bapi said, adding that although Russia had been announced as the builder of the first nuclear plant, it is obvious that China will most likely be capable of accomplishing the so-called second nuclear plant or even the third one in Kazakhstan long before Rosatom accomplishes its project.
“So, the de facto first nuclear plant in Kazakhstan will most likely be built by China, not Russia,” Bapi said.
Dosym Satpaev, an Almaty-based political analyst and head of the Risk Assessment Group, agreed with Bapi, saying, “Russia simply cannot finance major infrastructure right now.”
“Sklyar’s announcement about the decision to choose China to build the third plant came just as Russia declared that it will no longer build three thermal power stations in Kazakhstan, a $2 billion project promised in 2024,” Satpaev noted.
Satpaev also pointed to the Akkuyu nuclear plant in Turkey, also being built by Russia’s Rosatom, as a warning sign. There, workers recently staged protests over unpaid wages, reflecting Moscow’s growing inability to honor long-term commitments due to its economic strain from sanctions and war.
“As Russia’s Rosatom remains the contractor for Kazakhstan’s first-ever nuclear power plant, costing an estimated $14 billion, it is an expensive and risky endeavor,” Satpaev told RFE/RL.
Referendum As A Turning Point
The groundwork for Kazakhstan’s nuclear resurgence was laid in October 2024, when the government held a controversial referendum on whether to pursue nuclear energy development. Officially, more than 71 percent of voters supported the plan, but the referendum was marred by widespread allegations of ballot-stuffing, low turnout in major cities like Almaty (25 percent), and the arrests of over 30 activists.
Many in Kazakhstan criticized the idea of building nuclear plants in the country, citing environmental problems inherited from decades-long Soviet-era nuclear tests in the country’s northeast, Baikonur Cosmodrome’s operations, and fears of Russian involvement in the project.
Nonetheless, the government used the results of the referendum to justify its energy ambitions and signal international investors that public backing, however manufactured, existed.
Astana’s Nuclear Diplomacy: A Multi-Vector Strategy
Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev has repeatedly said Kazakhstan is open to partnerships with other countries, including South Korea’s electric powerhouse KHNP and France’s multinational electric utility company EDF, and has even floated the idea of an international consortium under the oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
However, the increasing strategic tilt toward China could strain Kazakhstan’s relations with these other potential partners. This shift in alliances could have significant implications for Kazakhstan’s foreign policy posture and its role in regional energy and security diplomacy.
Beijing has now been confirmed to operate the construction of two of the three planned plants, and Kazakhstan’s top nuclear officials have publicly praised Chinese capabilities. A location for the third plant is expected to be announced before the end of 2025, Kazakh officials said.
According to Bapi, this emerging pattern reveals a significant shift in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy posture: from passive balancing to active orchestration of great-power competition on its own terms.
“In choosing China as its primary nuclear partner, Kazakhstan is not just hedging against Russian volatility; it is asserting itself as an autonomous actor in regional energy and security diplomacy. This shift underscores Kazakhstan’s growing autonomy and influence in regional diplomacy,” Bapi emphasized.
“Kazakhstan’s current maneuvering in this matter is the reflection of the ongoing global geopolitical changes,” he said.
Why It Matters
Kazakhstan, the world’s leading uranium producer, has long been viewed as a neutral zone between rival powers. But its strategic value has grown since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, which definitely weakened Moscow’s soft power in the post-Soviet space.
Now, Astana is leveraging its energy sector, notably nuclear, to build long-term security and economic leverage.
“Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy is no longer about pleasing everyone equally; it’s about picking winners in critical sectors while avoiding excessive dependency,” Bapi said.
In March, Toqaev said, referring to the country’s energy strategy: “We do not choose one partner — we choose what is best for Kazakhstan.”
However, Satpaev warns China’s rapid strides in nuclear energy are not just about meeting energy needs.
“Building a nuclear power plant is never just about energy. It’s a geopolitical project. The supplying country provides the reactors, technical support, consulting, and often maintenance. That makes the host country dependent, both strategically and technologically,” he said.
“This dependence can have significant geopolitical implications, potentially compromising the host country’s sovereignty and security.”
Satpaev warned that by splitting its nuclear future between China and Russia, Kazakhstan risks undermining its national energy security, and by extension, its national sovereignty. This division could lead to a lack of control over the country’s energy resources, making it vulnerable to external influence, he stressed.
“In times of war, we’ve seen what happens. The aggressor’s first move is often to strike or choke off energy infrastructure. By relying on two major geopolitical players, Kazakhstan is compromising its independence,” Satpaev said.
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