Last week, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) embarked on two significant international engagements that reflect Jakarta’s attempts to navigate the increasingly complex geopolitical landscape.
On November 3, TNI launched the Keris Woomera Exercise with the Australian Defence Force (ADF), which the Australian Department of Defence described as the “largest combined joint activity in recent history” between the two armed forces.
The exercise involved approximately 2,000 personnel and commenced on board Australia’s Landing Helicopter Dock, HMAS Adelaide, while the warship was berthed in Darwin. The training will culminate in a series of complex maneuvers, including an amphibious landing and a joint live-fire demonstration in East Java, involving all three branches (army, navy, and air force) of the TNI and ADF.
Moreover, the TNI stated that Keris Woomera is expected to grow into a “major region-wide exercise” comparable to Super Garuda Shield (SGS), which Indonesia holds annually with the United States and other partners. This year’s iteration of SGS, held in Indonesia in August and September, involved around 5,500 military personnel from 11 countries.
Simultaneously, from November 4 to 10, the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) held its first-ever joint bilateral exercise with the Russian Navy. The “Orruda 2024” exercise took place in Surabaya City and the Java Sea, and involved four Russian and two Indonesian warships that worked together on a range of combat drills.
Notably, on November 7, a Russian Improved Kilo-class diesel-electric submarine, RFS Ufa, also arrived in the city, the first-ever port call by a Russian submarine in Indonesia. The visit was followed by knowledge-sharing exchanges between the two countries’ submariners.
Jakarta’s Double Game
Both Keris Woomera and Orruda represent a considerable advancement in Jakarta’s international defense engagements. However, Orruda unsurprisingly received significantly more attention given the international isolation of Russia since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
According to TNI-AL, the decision to conduct a joint exercise with the Russian Navy demonstrates Indonesia’s “free and active” foreign policy doctrine and is in line with the recently inaugurated President Prabowo Subianto’s view that in geopolitics, “a thousand friends are too few, and one enemy is too many.”
It should be noted that Orruda was not carried out on short notice. The Final Planning Conference took place last June, and the exercise was based on an agreement made between the two navies in 2018.
For Indonesia, hosting this exercise now – shortly after announcing its recent decision to join BRICS, and shortly before next month’s Heping Garuda 2024 exercise between TNI-AL and China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy – could be mistakenly interpreted by Western observers as a signal of Jakarta’s possible shift away from the West.
However, it is essential not to overlook Indonesia’s robust defense ties with Western nations, which have grown significantly in recent years. On a strategic level, for example, Indonesia and the U.S. agreed in 2023 to elevate their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which includes stronger collaboration in the maritime security and defense sectors. Furthermore, Jakarta and Canberra signed a new Defense Cooperation Agreement in August, which the Australian Government described as the most significant defense agreement the two nations have ever inked.
Additionally, Jakarta’s efforts to modernize its military by procuring foreign-made weapon systems are focused mainly on Western products. For instance, Indonesia has bought 42 Rafale fighter jets and two Scorpene Evolved submarines from France. It has also acquired A400M and C-130J transport aircraft from Airbus and Lockheed Martin, respectively, as well as two Thaon di Revel-class multipurpose combat ships from the Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri. In the space domain, the Indonesian Ministry of Defense has chosen France’s Thales Alenia Space to provide an earth observation satellite constellation.
Likewise, defense ties have grown notably at the operational level. In 2023, U.S. B-52 bombers and Australian F-35A fighters deployed to Indonesia for the first time. That year, the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) conducted aerial refueling exercises with the U.S., Australia, and France, in addition to the first joint sail of Indonesian and Australian submarines. In August, U.S. F-22 fighters made their first landing in Indonesia.
The past five years also saw new partnerships in training and education. The Indonesian Army Military Academy has welcomed instructors from Australia and the U.S., while TNI has sent more cadets to Western countries than anywhere else. These milestones demonstrate growing trust and interoperability between TNI and its Western counterparts.
In this context, the Orruda exercise and the scheduled Heping Garuda exercises should not be viewed as a pivot towards Russia and China but as an effort by Indonesia to rebalance after the considerable expansion in defense ties with its Western partners. These engagements complement, not replace, Jakarta’s much deeper defense ties with the West. They might even serve as a foundation for a stronger defense relationship with the West.
Can the Indonesian Military Keep Up?
In recent discussions on Indonesia’s international defense endeavor, an overlooked but crucial question is whether TNI can increase engagements with militaries from all geopolitical blocs while still meeting its commitments at home.
Currently, TNI’s force posture remains below its minimum requirements, and significant resource constraints impact its operational capabilities. TNI-AL’s surface fleet consists of only nine modern principal surface combatants: two Dutch-made SIGMA 10514 frigates, four SIGMA 9113 corvettes, and three British-built Nahkoda Ragam/Bung Tomo-class corvettes. TNI-AL relies on these ships for major exercises and overseas deployments.
This limited fleet capacity often faces intense operational demands. As an illustration, one of the two SIGMA frigates, KRI Raden Eddy Martadinata, left its homeport in Surabaya for nearly three months this year to participate in the U.S.-led RIMPAC Exercise in Hawaii. Meanwhile, its sister ship, KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai, embarked on the Kakadu Exercise in Australia shortly after, departing on August 30 and returning on September 22. KRI I Gusti Ngurah Rai also participated in the Orruda Exercise.
The Navy also regularly deployed one of its SIGMA corvettes to Lebanon for a year-long mission to support the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon Maritime Task Force.
A similar situation can be seen within the Air Force. During the recent Pitch Black Exercise in Australia, TNI-AU dispatched six F-16 fighters – a number that already constitutes a full 12 percent of its entire frontline fighter fleet of 33 F-16s and 16 Su-27/30s. As with Indonesia’s warships, these fighter jets are also required for domestic operations. In addition, they must undergo periodic maintenance cycles to keep them mission-ready and extend their lifespan.
Choosing which platforms to send on joint exercises with other countries adds another layer of complexity. Dispatching your top-line aircraft or ships could signal a strong commitment and high trust. In contrast, sending older or less capable platforms may communicate less commitment or caution. Besides, many assets simply lack the range, endurance, and other characteristics to represent TNI effectively.
TNI must also keep enough assets within the country for unscheduled missions, including humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations and evacuations of Indonesian citizens from conflict zones, which have become more common in recent years. Given all these factors, only a tiny portion of TNI’s assets is available for international engagement at any given time.
TNI’s overall capabilities will indeed improve in the upcoming years as it receives a range of new modern systems and platforms. However, even after these new assets are delivered, they will not be ready for international engagements immediately. Reaching full operational capability involves extensive testing, training, and integration, which can take years.
Of course, the challenges extend beyond just the limited availability of platforms. TNI’s capacity for international engagement is also significantly influenced by its budget and human resources.
Beyond Neutrality
Looking ahead, we will see a more active Indonesian military on the international stage as Prabowo aims to raise the country’s global profile while hewing to the country’s doctrine of non-alignment doctrine and maintaining good relationships with all geopolitical blocs. Nevertheless, it will be important for the government to choose engagements that go beyond merely signaling neutrality.
Prabowo’s administration must ensure that each defense engagement adds value to its defense strategy, aligns with its national interests, and supports TNI in gaining the experience, skills, and technology needed to become a more capable armed force.
To complicate matters further, the Indonesian Government and military must tread cautiously when expanding defense cooperation with multiple global powers, as deepening ties with one bloc could inadvertently limit collaboration opportunities with others. For instance, the U.S. might feel compelled to limit or even scale back certain types of military engagements with Indonesia if it perceives a risk of indirect leakage of intelligence, technology, and/or tactics between TNI and the Chinese and Russian armed forces.
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