The Ukrainian crisis “completely redefines the structure of our Europe. This crisis will make the continent even stronger and stronger”, adding that stated that “Europe must prepare itself for all scenarios. Europe must prepare itself to be independent of Russian gas, to be independent to ensure its own defence” – he called the EU to the world stage But stressed on the idea of strategic autonomy to make it self-reliant and assertive. The Ukrainian crisis has become a divisive moment for the European security architecture established after World War II.
The European security architecture established at the beginning of the Cold War focused on a traditional balance of power supported by nuclear deterrence. The idea behind this was not only to prevent large-scale invasions but also to limit unnecessary conflicts within the continent. Declaring that they were “resolved to unify their efforts for collective defense and the preservation of peace and security,” the 12 founding members of NATO signed the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, making the alliance the West’s became main security provider for Seventy years later, the challenges facing NATO have changed significantly. Nonetheless, the core of the Transatlantic Security Alliance still rests on three pillars: shared interests and values; political unity; and burden sharing for collective defence.
In the post-Cold War period, the alliance developed as an outward organization, as distinct from a military alliance designed to wage war against the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact according to the Cold War agenda. During this period, NATO became an organization of 30 member states. It undertook various operations beyond its traditional areas of interest. It adapted itself to operational interventions and served as a strong integrator in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. To strengthen its eastern flank following the 2014 Crimean crisis, it opened new command centers in eight member states: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. It has also strengthened its security in the Black Sea region by creating a new multinational force in Romania.
European Security Initiatives
During the Cold War period, Europe’s security was guaranteed by the US and NATO, giving the nascent European Community time to integrate politically and economically. Although there were attempts to create a defense identity at the European level for the European Community, the first such attempt can be traced back to the 1950s with the French proposal to establish a European Defense Community, however, the initiative did not materialize. . The second attempt was seen during the 1970s with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 on Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Military dimensions of the document Defined the security architecture for European territories – first, to refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; second, to recognize each other’s borders as well as the borders of all states in Europe to be inviolable third, to respect the territorial integrity of each participating state; and fourth, to refrain from making each other’s territory an object of military occupation. Any such occupation or acquisition shall not be recognized as legal.2 This was followed in 1990 by the CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe in which the signatories “fully recognized the freedom of states to choose their security arrangements”.3
With the establishment of the European Union, European defense integration gained momentum. The Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 established the European Union, with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as its central pillar. The CFSP covered all areas of security and foreign policy. The idea behind the common policy was that “the EU member states have their own importance at the international level.”4 The tasks carried out in this context were mainly missions of civilian crisis management.
The next step towards integration of European defense was taken at the Cologne European Council in 1999 with the establishment of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The CSDP enabled the EU to “use civilian, police and military equipment to cover the entire field of crisis prevention, crisis management and post-crisis rehabilitation”.5 Under this mandate, the EU The Union has launched several operations in crisis management such as Operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It has also launched a number of military operations, civilian and police missions in Asia, Middle East, Balkans, Africa and Eastern Europe.6 Till date, it has launched more than 30 missions.
However, from 2005 onwards, there was a period of stagnation due to the failure to adopt a constitutional treaty, followed by an economic crisis in 2008. However, the Treaty of Lisbon (which came into force in 2009) expanded the scope of the CSDP and policy, and institutionalized many achievements, yet, it was never on the priority list of member states as “national security” was valued and the CSDP lacked the wherewithal to pursue it There was a paucity of resources.
In the second decade of the 21st century, several issues prompted the European Union to seriously consider the revival of its defense programme. These were, firstly, the Crimean crisis of 2014; second, the 2016 Brexit vote that left the EU without its main military contributor; and third, the duality of US policies towards Europe. These events led the European Union to realize that it had to take more responsibility for its own defence. The EU released the Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy in 2016 to advance its vision of an independent security architecture.
The idea of an independent European defense policy gained new momentum in 2017 following the election of President Donald Trump. In an effort to enhance its own military capabilities, the EU launched a comprehensive defense package in 2017 that includes four strands – first, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) aimed at joint training and military equipment between EU member states; practice or enhance cooperation in various forms such as acquisition and development. Second, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD)7 which aims to monitor the defense plans of member states to coordinate spending and identify potential collaborative projects. Third, the European Defense Fund which aims to coordinate and enhance national investment in defense research and improve interoperability between national armed forces. Fourth, the Military Planning and Operations Capability (MPCC)8 which is a permanent operational headquarters for military operations with 2,500 troops deployed as part of the CSDP. The Ukraine crisis has given further impetus to the view that European defense needs to be strengthened through its own independent efforts and by strengthening NATO.
Evolving European Security Architecture
It cannot be denied that the Ukraine crisis has emerged as a turning point for the European security architecture. On the one hand, it has led to a unified and strong NATO, while on the other, it has led the European Union and its member states to take some important policy decisions in the context of defense integration.
The alliance was facing its most difficult phase in the last few years, when the French President termed NATO as ‘brain death’ in 2019, while former President Trump discredited the alliance and criticized the US exit from Afghanistan. attributed to the instability caused by Because of the Ukraine crisis, NATO is facing its most difficult challenge to the European security architecture since its inception. However, this crisis has only strengthened the alliance further. Statement by the Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, that “If the Kremlin aims to reduce NATO to Russia’s borders, it will only get more NATO. And if it seeks to split NATO, it will get an even more cohesive coalition”. 9 – A strong alliance seems to be foreshadowed. One of the major fallout of the crisis has been the strengthening of NATO’s eastern frontiers—during the Extraordinary Leaders’ Summit in March 2022, NATO announced that it would enter the region with new battle groups for Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. will double the number of Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) missions to eight to “strengthen Allied deterrence and defence”. EFP was approved.
In addition, it has also activated parts of its Response Force for the first time as a defensive measure in response to the crisis.11 It is a multinational force consisting of land, air, sea and special operations forces of allies known as the NATO Alliance. can be deployed immediately in support of In addition, NATO is also helping to coordinate Ukraine’s requests for assistance and is assisting Allies in providing humanitarian and non-lethal assistance.12 Individual member states are providing arms, ammunition, Sending military aid such as medical supplies and other critical military equipment.
The other major result has been the reorientation of the Nordic side towards NATO. While Iceland, Denmark and Norway have been part of NATO since 1949, Sweden and Finland both maintained neutrality. However, this neutrality did not mean that they were immune to the changing dynamics of the region. The Soviet Union used the Kola Peninsula and ports such as Murmansk and Archangel for its Northern Fleet, nuclear-armed submarines, and reactors. This prompted both Sweden and Finland to adopt a “policy of armed neutrality and territorial defence, based on compulsory conscription and high levels of defense expenditure”.13 During the post-Cold War period, both countries, when they Became part of the EU, contributed to the EU CSDP missions and formed the EU Battle Groups in the Sahel and the EU Training Group.
Participated in Southern Mission (EUTM). Sweden established a peacekeeping training center in view of its involvement in UN peacekeeping, while Finland, concerned about cyberattacks and Russian political interference, established an EU-NATO Center of Excellence in Helsinki to study hybrid warfare. Can go and reply.
The Ukraine crisis has dramatically changed political discourse and public opinion in Sweden and Finland. A public poll conducted in March 2022 indicated that up to 62% of Finnish citizens were in favor of joining the coalition, with only 16% opposing the move. This is a significant change from only 21% in favor in 2017.14 Similarly, in Sweden, support for joining NATO has increased to 59%, while only 17% are opposed.15 The prime ministers of both countries reiterated at their meeting in April 2022 that “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed the entire security landscape of Europe and dramatically shaped the mindset in the Nordic countries”.16 The two countries, when joining the alliance, So will bring highly advanced military and civil defense capabilities and expertise – at sea, land and air – that will be a value add to the alliance. While Russia has already warned Sweden and Finland against joining the alliance that “it will not bring stability to Europe as the alliance remains a tool towards confrontation”,17 their bid for membership will be discussed at the June 2022 NATO summit. It is expected to take place during the conference. With both countries now pushing for membership of the alliance, it marks a significant shift in security in Europe – as it marks the end of the neutrality and military non-alignment that Sweden has held for more than 200 years and Finland has followed since the defeat of the Soviet Union during World War II.
European Initiatives
The crisis has prompted the EU to emerge as an active actor both regionally and globally. During the crisis, the EU has shown unprecedented unity and a resolve to act swiftly. The Union has mobilized all means available, from sanctions to diplomacy, military aid and humanitarian aid. Its response to the crisis involved three key aspects – first, activating the European Peace Facility to support the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The equipment would provide €500 million to equip Ukraine with weapons, including lethal weapons. Also, in a move towards greater defense cooperation, the EU has announced the creation of a rapid reaction force as part of its strategic compass. Second, it has implemented coordinated sanctions on Russia. In total, the US and EU have imposed five rounds of sanctions on Moscow which include personal and economic measures; banning transactions with the Russian Central Bank; exclusion of major Russian banks from the SWIFT system; Banning Russian coal imports, etc. The sixth round of sanctions, which include sanctions on Russian oil, are still under discussion. Third, it is the first time the EU has issued a Temporary Safeguard Directive. This emergency mechanism provides protections to Ukrainian refugees, including rights to residence, the labor market, medical aid, and education. To directly support the people in Ukraine, the EU has also announced a significant package of humanitarian and financial assistance.
Another major outcome is the move by member states to increase their defense spending. According to Military Balance 2022, there has been a steady increase in the defense spending of European countries over the years. According to the report, “In 2021, European defense spending is set to grow by 4.8 percent in real terms, more than any other region. The 2021 increase… means that European spending represents 18.7 percent of the global total.18 The Ukrainian crisis has given further impetus to this as member states have announced further increases in their military spending, such as Belgium next Has announced an increase in spending from 0.9% to 1.54% in eight years. In addition, other member states such as Romania, Latvia, Poland plan to increase their defense spending to 2.5–3% of their GDP.
The third and most important development is that Germany abandoned its traditional defense prohibitions. Russian action in Ukraine has sharply reversed some of Germany’s fundamental policies. In his speech to the Bundestag on 27 February 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz said that Russia’s actions had “collapsed the European security order that had been in place for almost half a century since the Helsinki Final Act”. The Chancellor set out five steps of action19 that Germany is going to take – First, to support Ukraine – The key decision in this aspect was to supply arms to Ukraine – It would not allow lethal weapons to be transferred to a conflict zone That was a significant reversal of its practice. Second, to remove President Putin from the war path. It refers to the unprecedented sanctions imposed on Russia, cutting Moscow off from global financial systems. Third, to prevent the war from spreading to other countries in Europe. It strengthened Berlin’s commitment to NATO.
The air defense of allies in Eastern Europe and Romania. Fourth, invest more in the country’s security. Under this, the Chancellor announced that the federal budget for 2022 would provide a one-time sum of 100 billion euros for essential investments and armaments projects. In addition, he also set a target of increasing Germany’s defense expenditure to 2% of its economic output by 2024. Fifth, to secure energy supply with a view to eliminating dependence on imports from individual energy suppliers.
It is true that the Ukraine crisis has changed the strategic approach to European integration by highlighting the multidimensional nature of security issues and has given member states a new incentive to further enhance their defense capabilities. As stated earlier, the EU had been working towards an independent defense policy since 2017, yet, the return of power politics has made it possible for the EU to accelerate its development as a credible security player. Made you realize. In the short term, various member states have announced increased defense spending, supported Ukraine by providing military and humanitarian aid, and imposed sanctions on Russia. However, in the long term, significant efforts are needed to strengthen NATO’s deterrence, while at the European level, there is a need to formulate a comprehensive security policy with increased investment in enhancing its defense capabilities.