Serried ranks of ballistic and cruise missiles marked the culminating phalanxes in Chairman Xi Jinping’s massive military parade in Tiananmen Square in Beijing on 3 September, a site that once ran with the blood of Chinese students seeking democratic freedom.
Such strategic weapons are operated by the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), into which Xi has been pouring billions of dollars.
The parade’s cruise missile formation comprised three weapons. One was the PLARF’s CJ-1000 scramjet-powered land attack cruise missile carried on a 10×10 truck. The land-based CJ-1000 is China’s first hypersonic cruise missile, and it improves upon the CJ-100 missile that was exhibited in 2019. It flies faster, is more manoeuvrable and can penetrate defences better than its predecessor. The US military assesses it has a 6,000km range.
The second cruise missile was the air-launched, long-range CJ-20A that is designed to hit ground targets such as command nodes or underground hangars. Taiwan possesses an abundance of such targets and, when launched from an H-6K bomber, missiles like the CJ-20A can approach targets from unexpected directions.
Thirdly, the long-range YJ-18C is a land attack cruise missile that performs “surgical strikes”. Armed with an estimated 500kg warhead, the stealthy missile probably flies at subsonic speeds but with a supersonic dash capability. Its launch platform is unclear, whether submarine, surface combatants or even shipping container, but its range is said to reach beyond the First Island Chain.
Turning to another formation of missiles, the PLA paraded three types of hypersonic weapon; hypersonic is defined as speeds exceeding Mach 5. Commentators said such missiles perform roles such as breaking through island chains and striking enemy aircraft carriers.
One type was the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle that debuted in a 2019 parade, but a brand new weapon was the DF-26D intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). Unfortunately, Beijing revealed virtually nothing about the DF-26D’s characteristics, but given that it took part in this particular formation, it can be assumed that it adopts some form of hypersonic configuration. It is designed to fly beyond the Second Island Chain.
Conventional and nuclear-armed versions of the DF-26 “Guam killer” missile already exist. This dual role of the DF-26 is particularly problematic, since an enemy would not know whether an incoming missile is carrying a conventional or a nuclear warhead.
Also in the hypersonic missile formation was the YJ-21 ballistic missile designed to be launched from H-6K bombers against either naval or land targets. This two-stage missile has a range of perhaps 1,500km, and it can strike high-value targets such as aircraft carriers.
The final formations featured PLARF nuclear-tipped missiles, the ultimate strategic weapon. Of course, no real warheads were present, but the new missile types on show reflect China’s astronomical investment in its nuclear-warhead stockpile, the most intensive expansion in nuclear weapons the world has ever seen.
One major surprise was a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) labelled the DF-61 carried by a 16×16 launcher truck. Little has been revealed about this new missile, especially when the similar-looking DF-41 ICBM was unveiled at a Beijing parade just six years ago. The DF-61 may be a modified version of the DF-41, although it must be different enough to warrant a new nomenclature.
An official US military equipment guide suggests the DF-61’s range is 18,000km. It gives Beijing a more robust second-strike capability, though it is unclear how many multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) this ICBM has. Some have suggested three 5Mt warheads, and other sources guess up to a dozen. The arrival of the DF-61 means the PLARF has nine types of land-based ICBM in service – five road-mobile and four silo-based.
Another new ICBM in the parade was the DF-5C, a liquid-fuelled missile launched from silos. The Pentagon claims the DF-5C has a multi-megaton warhead, and Chinese commentary said its range is sufficient to reach anywhere in the world. Thus able to attack from any direction, the DF-5C carries an unknown number of MIRVs, but perhaps ten by many estimates.
Also debuting was the DF-31BJ, which is an ICBM launched from underground silos. The DF-31BJ was carried on a 16×16 transporter that can presumably load missiles into underground silos. China has established three large missile silo fields deep in China’s interior, and the Pentagon reported that the PLARF had begun loading solid-fuelled DF-31-class missiles into these silos. The DF-31BJ’s range is likely similar to the DF-31AG’s, an estimated 11,200-13,000km.
Importantly, Beijing showed its complete nuclear triad in the 3 September parade. As well as the DF-5C, DF-31BJ and DF-61, the PLARF showed off the JL-1 air-launched nuclear-tipped missile and the JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile.
The JL-3 has been arming PLA Navy Type 094A ballistic missile submarines since at least 2022. The JL-3 looks similar to the JL-2 paraded in 2019, but it is said to have a longer range of around 10,000km. That would mean it can reach the continental USA from submarine launch positions within Chinese coastal waters. The JL-3 is said to carry an unspecified number of MIRVs, perhaps three.
This was the first time China had displayed an air-launched nuclear missile, and the JL-1 is normally carried by H-6N strategic bombers. Of course, with China developing the H-20 stealth bomber, which did not emerge in the parade, this will be a future platform for the JL-1 too. Its range could be in excess of 9,000km, and this kind of air-launched nuclear capability gives China greater flexibility and mobility.
Notably, this was the only time a Chinese military parade had featured a complete nuclear triad. A commentator explained that the triad “is a strategic trump card for safeguarding national sovereignty and defending national dignity”.
by Gordon Arthur
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