Twenty-five years after the fateful terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the fraternity of terrorism scholars and practitioners is divided over al-Qaida’s status. Some believe that al-Qaida still poses a potent threat to global peace and security, albeit of a different nature, while others think it has lost its mojo.
Indeed, al-Qaida failed to create the Sunni global Caliphate it promised its followers. In fact, the global jihadist movement split between al-Qaida and the Islamic State (IS), which weakened the former. IS has superseded al-Qaida as the dominant global jihadist actor. The ideological tussle and inter-group fighting between al-Qaida and IS have helped security and intelligence agencies around the world to cut them to size.
The strategic defeat that al-Qaida desperately wanted to inflict upon the United States has not materialized. Indubitably, the U.S. is struggling to retain its global hegemony in the face of China’s meteoric rise, but it is for a different set of reasons. Attributing power challenges to the U.S.-led unipolar system to al-Qaida would be a gross exaggeration and distortion of facts.
In terrorism, violence is the central benchmark of evaluating the success or failure of a terrorist group. Al-Qaida Core, operating out of Afghanistan, has not carried out an international terrorist attack in more than a decade.
The majority of al-Qaida’s top leaders, barring the current de facto chief Saif al-Adel and his deputy Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, have been eliminated by the U.S. in drone strikes and targeted assassinations. Saif al-Adel likely lives in a safe house in Iran and is dependent on Iranian intelligence for his own security. This has undermined his credibility and capacity to command loyalty and obedience from various al-Qaida affiliates.
Of al-Qaida’s various affiliates, Somalian al-Shabab, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in Mali are the strongest, while al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), notwithstanding its proximity to the core group, is the weakest.
AQIS has been trying to grow its network in India, especially in Indian-administered Kashmir, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Barring some nominal successes, it has miserably failed to make an impression since its emergence in September 2014. Nevertheless, it regularly issues a flagship propaganda magazine, “Nawai Ghazwa-e-Hind,” which articulates al-Qaida’s official stance on critical developments. AQIS has been embedding its fighters with various Pakistani jihadist groups to obfuscate its involvement in terrorist attacks, which is consistent with al-Qaida Core’s strategy of focusing on the near-enemy, as discussed below.
Al-Qaida is currently facing a serious leadership crisis, and it will not be surprising if various affiliates still loyal to the mother group adopt the pathway of IS and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The former’s defection made it the most feared jihadist group and leader of the global jihadist movement, while the latter’s rebellion eased its path to victory in Syria and helped it gain international recognition.
Al-Qaida’s Malian affiliate, JNIM, which has made great territorial strides in Mali, is contemplating following HTS’ footsteps and disassociating from al-Qaida to avoid isolation and reprisals ahead of its complete victory.
At its peak, al-Qaida funded and strategically guided different jihadist groups around the world, including the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Ironically, it is now dependent on the Taliban both for its finances and security. Al-Qaida Core has been reduced to a former shadow of itself; it inspires no confidence in the younger generation of jihadists who self-radicalize online and engage in lone-actor terrorism.
Those who believe al-Qaida continues to be a threat to international peace and security argue that after two decades of the war on terror, the U.S. left Afghanistan by handing back power to the Taliban. Al-Qaida successfully weathered the U.S. strategic pressure and retained its presence in Afghanistan, which constitutes a victory even if it is a pyrrhic one, they claim.
In five years of Taliban rule, al-Qaida has reconstituted itself by embedding with local jihadist movements in Pakistan. It is actively supporting an umbrella militant alliance, Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP). The resurgence of militant violence in Pakistan since August 2021 has increased al-Qaida’s footprint, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Likewise, al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, and Mali have made substantive territorial, financial, and organizational gains.
The threat al-Qaida poses today is qualitatively different from the security challenges it posed to international peace in 2001. The absence of an international mass casualty attack does not make al-Qaida less relevant. Rather, there is a need to take a more nuanced view of the threat it poses.
The terror group has not changed its goal of creating a global Sunni Caliphate or carrying out attacks in the West. However, as the international security environment has evolved, al-Qaida has also changed its trajectory and modus operandi. Now, it is focusing on the near-enemy, i.e., Muslim democratic states that it deems apostate, instead of the “far-enemy,” meaning the United States.
Al-Qaida is no longer investing its time and focus in high-profile attacks like 9/11; rather, it is creating space for itself by aligning with local jihadist movements and obscuring its presence to avoid counterterrorism pressure. It is adopting emerging technologies like drones and 3D-printed technology to build weapons, investing in maritime capabilities, and striving to achieve financial self-sufficiency. All these elements make al-Qaida a potent threat in the long run.
Over a period of 25 years, al-Qaida has shown resilience. It has survived by adapting, decentralizing operations to regional franchises, and moving ideological indoctrination to encrypted social and digital media platforms.
The current threat from al-Qaida is diffused. It relies on homegrown, lone-actor terrorists to carry out low-end attacks, such as stabbing, vehicle ramming, and shootings in the West. This threat, due to its low intensity, is more manageable but less detectable and preventable because people are self-radicalizing online. Furthermore, al-Qaida is engaging in hybrid warfare tactics where violence is one of several elements it is using to achieve its objectives.
So, the singular fixation with al-Qaida’s violent credentials is flawed. Al-Qaida engages in information, ideological, and cognitive warfare alongside violent extremism. It has advised its affiliates to focus on governance by moderating their aggressive jihadist postures.
On balance, al-Qaida has survived the war on terror, and it is far from a spent force; however, the threat it poses is now manageable. At the same time, it is facing credibility and leadership crises that are not likely to subside anytime soon.
On the one hand, for the Taliban regime, al-Qaida is a liability. It can neither own the group nor disown it. The former will result in international diplomatic and security pressure, and the latter will dent the Taliban’s ideological legitimacy in the jihadist world. Likewise, for flourishing regional affiliates like Al-Shabab, JNIM, and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaida Core is more of a nuisance than an ideological mothership.
Al-Qaida remains relevant, but it has evolved and the threat it poses has also evolved. Putting this fact in perspective will help both practitioners and scholars to develop a better understanding of the terror group.
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