Taking part in an election is seldom a walk in the park. But the Thai Senate race, which culminated this week, has put its candidates and voters through the shrubbiest of hedge mazes—and raised questions about the still-evolving state of democracy in the Southeast Asian nation of 72 million.
Thailand’s 2024 Senate election is the first of its kind after the upper legislative body was created by the country’s 2017 constitution that was implemented after successive coups had ousted former Thai governments—though the first group of Senators was not elected but rather appointed by the military in 2019.
As the country has slowly begun to cast aside its military leaders—in general elections last year for the National Assembly’s lower chamber, voters overwhelmingly supported parties that ran on a pro-democratic platform—the fact that the military-appointed Senate (nicknamed “the junta’s senators”) remained in power until this year seemed a vestige of the past.
Last year, the Senate thwarted the progressive and most popular candidate for Prime Minister from taking the premiership, handing it instead to the more moderate Srettha Thavisin, who formed a coalition with the military- and royal-linked conservative establishment.
Now, even as those Senators leave office, the process for choosing their replacements has been described as the “most complicated election in the world” and slammed by critics as unnecessarily convoluted and undemocratic.
Here’s what to know about the Thai Senate election—and where Thailand goes from here.
A closed vote behind closed doors
On Wednesday, nearly 3,000 senator candidates met at a convention center near Bangkok to vote on one another. Over the next few hours, they were whittled down until 200 emerged as the next batch of senators. By Thursday, an unofficial list of winners was out, marking an end to what has been mostly a quiet race, devoid of overt campaigning or much public discussion—hardly a surprise, as non-candidates were not allowed to vote.
The election was anything but straightforward. According to the rules, Senate candidates have to be at least 40 years old; be born in or have stayed at least two years in the district they’re representing; and possess a minimum of 10 years of professional experience in one of 20 stipulated sectors—ranging from education to public health to women and the arts—that they would also represent. There was also an entry fee of 2,500 baht (about $68). After six rounds of intra- and inter-group voting among the thousands of candidates, 10 senators from each of the 20 categories would make it into the Senate.
Why such a complex process?
“One interpretation is that this system was designed from the ground up to be deliberately confusing and to yield an incoherent body,” Napon Jatusripitak, a visiting fellow at the Singapore-based ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, tells TIME. “Basically, it’s a way of diluting the possibility of changing the political system through a parliamentary process.”
The pro-democracy group Internet Dialogue on Law Reform (iLaw) noted that while the Senate election only permitted independents, the race has been dominated by powerful political dynasties, which have managed to field their family members and allies in almost every category. The group also criticized the Election Commission for the limited broadcasting of the voting on Wednesday, which made it difficult for the public to observe the process.
The other, more charitable, interpretation, Napon says, is that the drafters of the Senate election law simply “did not fully think it through.”
Mixed results
According to the preliminary results, which will be made official on Tuesday, some prominent conservative names emerged as senators-elect, such as former army general Kriangkrai Srirak, an ex-classmate of deputy Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul; and veteran politician Premsak Piayura, who is linked to the royalist Democrat Party and was convicted in 2018 of abusing a reporter over an unflattering story. (Notably, also on the list were several human rights activists, academics, and journalists.)
“The Senate race is not really an election, per se,” says Napon. “It’s a self-selection process where it allows patronage politics to run rampant at every stage.”
Nevertheless, there had been some grassroots efforts to even the playing field: civil society groups including iLaw had campaigned to get pro-democracy representatives to run in the Senate race and divert votes from dynasty-linked candidates.
But pushing back against such a “flawed” process, says Mark S. Cogan, associate professor of peace and conflict studies at Japan’s Kansai Gaidai University, is only going to have limited effectiveness. “We say it’s a Senate election. It’s not. It’s a Senate appointment.”
“It was never fair to begin with,” he tells TIME. “To a certain extent, the dam has broken, and you’re saying, ‘Let’s put our fingers in the dam, and maybe we can prevent some of the water from escaping.’ No, it’s broken.”
The current crisis of Thai democracy
“It cannot be worse than the last lot of 250 senators appointed by the military during the coup era,” Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a political science professor at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, tells TIME. But, he still caveats, “the Senate election is not democratic because the people don’t have a vote.”
“Thailand, after two decades dominated by conservatives, can only be described as semi-autocratic at best,” says Thitinan. “It cannot be considered a democracy when election winners are repeatedly kicked out and dissolved either by military coups or judicial interventions.”
Cogan is more blunt in his assessment: Thailand, he says, “is simply an authoritarian regime which has the illusion of democracy.”
That true democracy is still lacking in Thailand is apparent to the Thai public. According to a survey by the Asia Foundation, conducted last year and published earlier this month, 58% think that Thailand is either undemocratic or only a little democratic (compared to somewhat or very democratic), while 84% said democracy is always the best way (compared to 15% who said the country needs strong leadership whether elected or not).
Among those under 40, the numbers are even more pronounced. “They came of age during the Prayuth era,” says Cogan of Thailand’s youth, referencing former Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, who seized power during the 2014 military coup and oversaw a period of suppression of human and civil rights. “They know what democracy does not look like.”
“I think that the broader general public in Thai society have become distrustful of the supposedly democratic process in Thailand,” says Napon. “There is an election, but there is no accountability; there is a selection process, but it doesn’t seem to produce something that would be reflective or responsive of the public’s needs and preferences.”
Where does Thailand go from here?
Unlike their predecessors, the new senators will not be able to vote on the next Prime Minister. They will, however, have the power to veto constitutional changes. The Senate also oversees membership to institutions like the Constitutional Court, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Election Commission—bodies that have all been accused of bending to conservative interests.
“The key mechanisms through which conservative forces in Thailand exercise their power is through so-called referee bodies,” explains Napon.
Still, observers maintain that democratization looks to be inevitable, in the long run, for Thailand. Last year’s general election delivered a clear mandate for progressives who dare to defy the repressive military and royal establishment, and former activists have begun to make their way into the halls of power.
Looming over conservative forces’ decadeslong hamfisted domination of Thai politics, which has clearly become unpopular, is an expiration date.
The fear is, what else will happen before then? Human rights activists have continued to be jailed and prosecuted, many on trumped-up charges of royal defamation.
Napon also warns, in the face of such societal change, there’s a danger of Thailand suffering an authoritarian backlash as the old guard grows desperate to preserve its waning influence. “If the incoming Senate fails to function in ways that pander to the interests of conservative forces,” he says, “the only means to influence the political system would be through other means—through outside means, more coercive, more repressive means. And that’s not good for Thai democracy either.”
“Even the dying embers of a regime, when you think that regime is dead, it’s like a wounded animal,” says Cogan. “It’s gonna fight with its last breath for its life.”
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