As the Israeli-US war against Iran rages across the Middle East, is it possible that Saudi Arabia is getting off more lightly? Public reporting strongly suggests that it is, which begs the question why.
The evidence is pretty clear: so far, Iranian strikes on Saudi Arabia have been fewer in number and, at least in the first phase, less intense than those on some other Gulf neighbours, particularly the UAE and. to a lesser extent, Qatar and Kuwait.
The BBC reported early on in the conflict that Saudi Arabia and Oman, two countries that have long hosted US and Western military forces, have both escaped a lot more lightly than the other four Gulf Arab states.
An Atlantic Council analysis notes that in the first 48 hours after US‑Israeli strikes, Iran carried out just two attacks on Saudi Arabia, compared to more than 150 missiles and five hundred drones against the UAE.”
And a March 1 report out of Beirut by Breaking Defence suggested the UAE had already dealt with 165 ballistic missiles, 2 cruise missiles and 541 drones; Qatar with 18 incoming projectiles; Kuwait with 97 ballistic missiles and 283 drones; and Bahrain 45 missiles and 9 drones. Saudi Arabia confirmed incoming fire but “has not put out hard figures,” implying both fewer strikes and/or less transparency compared with the UAE and Kuwait in particular.
It’s early days yet, and this is a rapidly evolving situation, but all told thus far, while Saudi Arabia has experienced strikes against US military and intelligence targets, there has been apparently less effort to target the country’s major infrastructure or civilian hubs—unlike its neighbours in the Gulf states. And disruption to civilian air traffic to and from Saudi Arabia has been relatively slight. Reuters reports that Saudi airports are affected by diversions and some cancellations but are not listed among the most heavily shutdown hubs.
It has not gone unnoticed that Saudi Arabia stands to be in the unusual position of benefitting economically from the war. The resulting rising oil prices will be advantageous to the Kingdom, given they have a surplus to offer. They also stand to gain some of Iran’s market share, given the current limitations on Iran being able to supply. None of this will hurt Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to fund their Vision 2023 projects.
Is Iran trying to drive a wedge between Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states? Does this hinge on other mutual interests? Likely this goes back to the Chinabrokered agreement reached between both countries in March 2023, which didn’t end the rivalry, just parked it.
After seven years of broken ties, Riyadh and Tehran agreed to reopen embassies, revive dormant security accords and stop actively sabotaging one another’s core interests. For Saudi Arabia, the bargain bought a quieter neighbourhood for Vision 2030 and a way out of the Yemen culdesac; for Iran, it loosened regional isolation at a moment of domestic strain. Both also signalled—at least on paper—that proxy attacks, especially via the Houthis in northern Yemen, who have been a thorn in Saudi Arabia’s side for decades, would be dialled down rather than escalated.
The Houthis are a crucial swing factor in this war. Part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, they have long used by Iran to squeeze Saudi Arabia. Iranian backing for Houthi missiles, drones and Red Sea disruption gave Tehran a cheap way to menace Saudi territory and energy assets without firing directly on the Kingdom.
But the cautious rapprochement between their Tehran paymasters and their old enemy has drawn the Houthis into new deals with Riyadh—a mix of tacit and written understandings on borders, revenues and airstrikes which the Houthis are in no hurry to throw away. And it can be assumed that the Iranians would not wish to test the loyalty of their proxies over their new, cosier arrangement with Riyadh.
It’s an ill wind that blows nobody any good, and in this case it seems the Saudis are getting off more lightly than the rest of the neighbourhood because it just works better for this old love-hate triangle.
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Willy Fautré is the founder of Human Rights Without Frontiers (Belgium). A former chargé de mission at the Belgian Ministry of National Education and the Belgian Parliament, he is the director of Human Rights Without Borders, a Brussels-based NGO he founded in 2001. He is a co-founder of the Raoul Wallenberg Committee (Belgium).
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