The long-simmering border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia erupted into a higher intensity military clash in July and December 2025, which saw the participation of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) in a high-intensity conflict for the first time since World War II. During the conflict, the RTAF proved its status as a highly professional air force – one that belongs to the front ranks of Southeast Asia’s air forces.
This article uses available open-source information to assesses the RTAF’s air operations against the Royal Cambodian Army (RCA) during the July and December border clashes. It also discusses what the fighting revealed about the RTAF’s current capability today.
July 2025 – Operation Yuttha Bodin
Multiple clashes between Thai and Cambodian forces since the spring of 2025 led to a major escalation of hostilities on July 24, when Cambodia fired BM-21 rockets across the border, killing at least 11 Thai civilians and one soldier.
In response, the Thai military launched Operation Yuttha Bodin, a coordinated air and land assault, to defend Thai sovereignty, retaliate against Cambodian military actions along the border, and to reduce Cambodian military capability in order to preserve Thai state security and public safety.
On the first day of the operation, on July 24, the RTAF dispatched two missions totaling 10 strike sorties against RCA military command posts and army positions in the Ta Moan Thom temple area in Oddar Meanchey province.
During the five-day operation, the RTAF operated under a joint tactical plan, with Army Commander Gen. Pana Klaewplodthuk acting as the overall joint force commander. The RTAF provided direct support to a ground offensive by the Royal Thai Army (RTA).
The primary geographic focus of Operation Yuttha Bodin was on the disputed border area adjacent to Thailand’s Surin province and Cambodia’s Oddar Meanchey province (see Table 1). The RTAF provided support to the RTA, specifically in areas of active fighting, conducting air strikes to neutralize Cambodian C2 posts, troop strongholds and artillery positions, and weapons and ammunition supply depots.
Besides the Wing 1 F-16s in Korat, a major RTAF air force base located northeast of Bangkok, the 7 Wing, deployed its key assets from their home base in Surin to the base, including JAS39 Gripen fighters and Saab 340 Erieye AEW&C and Saab 340 ELINT aircraft to support the operation.
Together with the base’s 103 Squadron, 1 Wing, and 403 Squadron, 4 Wing F-16s, which had also dispatched aircraft to Korat from its base in Takhli, northwest of Bangkok, and the Gripen detachment, the three units represented the brunt of the RTAF’s offensive force.
The F-5TH and F-16s from the 21 Wing in Ubon Ratchathani, near the Thai-Cambodian border and the 4 Wing at Takhli executed all-important defensive counter air missions to protect critical military and civilian infrastructure.
The 702 Squadron’s Erieye aircraft flew day and night, providing a unified aerial picture, airspace management, and deconfliction between the different offensive and defensive assets in close coordination with the air force’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS) at Wing 6 Don Mueang base in Bangkok.
Critically, while the RTA led the overall joint force, the RTAF (through the ACCS) held control of all air assets and responded to requests from RTA for air support.
Other critical assets included the Sa Kaeo-based 3 Wing – the RTAF’s dedicated uncrewed aerial systems unit – which operated the Aerostar BP and Dominator XP UAS, and 7 Wing’s Saab 340 electronic intelligence platform, which provided critical intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting (ISTAR) and battle-damage assessment (BDA) support to the joint force during the operation.
In addition, the RTAF and the Thai Army deployed their ground-based air defense systems to provide additional cover for ground forces and forward bases against air-based threats.
During the operation, the RTA employed multiple types of uncrewed systems that ranged from bomb-dropping quadcopters dropping munitions on RCA trenches to larger DP-20 MALE UAS, which provided additional battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance support.
Table 1. July 2025 – Operation Yuttha Bodin. Source: Author’s compilation from various sources.
December 2025 – Resumption of Air Campaign
In December, in response to what Thailand described as the RCA’s continued provocations and movement of heavy equipment and combat forces into disputed border areas, the Thai military launched Operation Sattawat, which aimed to “penetrate and destroy the opposing side’s combat support structures and strategic supply routes.”
To support the RTA’s operation on the ground, the RTAF targeted Cambodian C2, drone control facilities, weapons and ammunition depots, logistics, and equipment that could pose a threat to “national security and civilian safety.”
In a major departure from the more geographically constrained operations against RCA forces and supplies adjacent to Surin province during Operation Yuttha Bodin, the December air campaign saw the RTAF expand its target list to encompass the entire length of the shared border (see Table 2).
In addition to the frequent close air support missions along the border, the RTAF carried out some deep strike operations to destroy selected bridges and weapons depots deep inside Cambodia. For example, on December 24, Thai fighters penetrated as deep as 100 kilometers into Cambodian territory in Battambang Province to hit a weapons depot there.
Table 2. December 2025 – Resumption of Thai air campaign. Source: Author’s compilation from various sources.
Although not publicly disclosed like the 1 Wing and 4 Wing F-16s and 7 Wing Gripens use in strike missions, visual evidence of bomb mission marking on other units and combat aircraft like the F-5TH “Super Tigris” and T-50TH from the 21 Wing and 4 Wing verify their active participation in strike missions as well.
Tempo and Targeting
During the July operation, the RTAF flew two to three combat missions daily, involving two to four combat aircraft per mission. On the first day of heavy fighting, larger formations (up to 10 combat aircraft in total) were involved in strikes in anticipation of a greater level of resistance (see Table 1). The lower-than-expected opposition allowed required sorties to be reduced to an average of four sorties or two two-ship missions per day. In total, RTAF conducted 28 strike sorties during Operation Yuttha Bodin.
Compared to July, it appears that the RTAF operated at a higher operational tempo in December, based on the known targets struck and the geographic spread of combat operations (see Table 2). For example, during the more active phase of ground fighting on December 18-19, the RTAF flew a larger number of sorties against RCA forces along the length of the shared border, including in Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey, and Banteay Meanchey provinces.
Critically, the publicly released sorties only consider actual strike sorties. Several supporting sorties, including defensive counter air, airspace surveillance and strike coordination, reconnaissance and target acquisition, electromagnetic domain monitoring, and airlift sorties were carried out simultaneously, even if not publicly acknowledged.
The bombing effort was preceded and supplemented by an attempt to locate any ground-based air defense threats and eliminate them. To achieve this, RTAF deployed crewed and uncrewed ISTAR assets, including the 7 Wing’s Saab 340 ELINT was used to establish the Cambodian forces’ electronic order of battle along the key operational axes opposite Ubon Ratchathani, Buri Ram, Surin, Si Sa Ket, Sa Kaeo, and Chanthaburi Provinces.
The RTAF and RTA uncrewed ISTAR aircraft deployed the Aerostar BP and Dominator XP UAS and Defense Technology Institute (DTI) DP-20 MALE UAS to reconnoiter the border area, locate RCA force disposition, and provide post-strike battle damage assessment.
To reconnoiter targets and provide precision-guidance for PGMs, RTAF combat aircraft employed Litening-III targeting pod (Gripen and F-5TH) and the Sniper ATP pod (F-16 and TA-50TH)—to find, fix, identify, engage, and BDA (battle damage assessment) targets.
Weapons Deployment
The RTAF dropped more than 30 tons of munitions on Cambodian positions during Operation Yuttha Bodin. Munitions employed included unguided general-purpose bombs (GPBs) and precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and direct attack and standoff weapons.
The most commonly employed munitions included the Mk. 82 high-explosive GPB and laser-guided 500-lb Lizard-III and/or GBU-12-kitted PGMs. Some 2,000-lb Mk. 84 high-explosive GPB and AGM-65 Maverick air-to-ground missiles were also employed against larger hardened targets and RCA armor.
In addition, the 500-lb Korean GPS-guided glide-bomb (KGGB) was used in combat for the first time. The KGGB was reportedly employed especially during the opening phase of the conflict to provide standoff range in the face of potential Cambodian deployment of its Chinese-made medium-range KC-1 surface-to-air missile system along the border.
Importantly, the RTAF sources many of these weapons from the United States and Israel, as well as South Korea. In addition, the Thai defense industry is thought to manufacture variants of the Mk. 82 bombs, which can be mated with the Israeli (Elta Lizard-III and GBU-12) and Korean (LIG Nex1 KGGB) precision-guidance kits. The diversified and largely non-U.S. supply of key munitions and their guidance kits make the RTAF more resilient against a potential U.S. arms embargo.
Pictures of RTAF fighters that have surfaced since the border clash show large numbers of sorties on individual aircraft. For example, an F-16B has been spotted with 63 bombing mission markings; T-50THs with 32 and 34 Mk. 82 bomb mission markings; an F-5TH with 20 Mk. 82 bomb mission markings; and a Gripen with seven GBU-12 mission markings. These indicate that the real sortie numbers may be higher than publicly reported. They also highlight the employment of all of RTAF’s primary combat aircraft in bombing sorties – something which has not been disclosed publicly.
In addition to aircraft delivered munitions, Thailand has also drawn lessons from recent conflicts by employing indigenous KB-5E and KB-10G long-range loitering munitions and one-way attack drones (OWADs) in combat for the first time. Thai forces deployed the capability alongside scouting drones, artillery and air support in a multilayered reconnaissance-strike complex.
Opposition and Losses
The RTAF’s losses during the July and December operations were very low. The Thai military is known to have lost at least two aircraft during December fighting. On December 17, a DP-20 UAV of the RTA was lost for an unknown reason. The second aircraft, an RTAF Aerostar BP UAV, was reportedly shot down over Cambodia’s Banteay Meanchey Province on December 21.
Importantly, enabling RTAF impunity of operations was the fact that Cambodia has no fast jet air power of its own. Despite having acquired Chinese-made KC-1 medium-range surface-to-air missile system and the very short-range QW-3 MANPAD, they posed little opposition to RTAF operations.
The Verdict
The July and December 2025 border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia were the first major conflict that saw a large-scale deployment of Thai air power in support of its ground forces. It was also the largest deployment of air power in Southeast Asia since the Vietnam War.
It employed and tested nearly all of the combat assets and enablers in the RTAF’s inventory, including both crewed and uncrewed tactical aviation.
Critically, the conflict successfully showcased results of the RTAF’s more than decade-long effort to create a truly network-centric force. It employed all key enablers in a demonstration of modern air power, using domestic datalink (the Link-T) to coordinate and communicate between C2 nodes, ISR assets, and strike aircraft.
The air force’s Erieye AEW&C platform provided effective airspace control, coordinating and deconflicting defensive counterair aircraft and ground-based air defenses from strike aircraft ingressing or egressing from target areas, while various crewed and uncrewed platforms provided effective tactical and strategic level ISR and targeting for the joint force.
The brief air campaign included many firsts. This was the first time the Swedish Gripen had dropped bombs in anger. It was also the first real-world test for the Korean KGGB glide bomb and the indigenous KB-series OWADs. The RTAF demonstrated that it has taken great strides in the integration of uncrewed platforms into the force.
Although Cambodia could not challenge RTAF in the air, the threat of “pop-up” air defense threats posed by the RCA’s VSHORAD and SHORAD systems and explosive-armed small drones remained real throughout the conflict.
Underlining its status as one of the region’s most professional air forces, the RTAF sustained only very limited losses, while meeting many of its stated objectives. These included reducing the threat posed by RCA heavy weaponry to the state and civilian population, and reasserting deterrence.
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