Malawi president Peter Mutharika
A government press release meant to dismiss rumours about Malawi’s vice-president may instead have drawn attention to a deeper issue: the steady concentration of executive power at the presidency.
On 28 March, the office of the president and cabinet issued a statement signed by Malawi’s chief secretary Justin Saidi, which rejected social media claims that first vice-president Jane Mayemu Ansah was being “victimised and systematically sidelined”.
The statement described the allegations as “false, baseless and deliberately misleading” and cited section 90(1) of Malawi’s constitution, which requires presidential decisions to be expressed in writing under the president’s signature.
But governments rarely deploy their most senior civil servant to rebut unverified online speculation. The statement’s very existence suggests that the controversy surrounding Ansah’s role touches on something more significant than political gossip.
At stake is the transfer of the department of disaster management affairs (DoDMA) from the office of the vice-president to the office of the president and cabinet (OPC), a move that has implications for disaster governance, donor confidence and the internal balance of power within Malawi’s executive.
Saidi announced the transfer of DoDMA on 10 January 2026 as part of a broader public sector reform agenda. The responsibility for public sector reforms was also moved to OPC.
On paper, the changes were administrative. In practice, they removed the vice-president’s most substantive operational portfolio.
In November 2025, shortly after beginning his second term, President Peter Mutharika had delegated oversight of DoDMA to Ansah. Within weeks, controversy erupted over her Christmas visit to Nottingham in the United Kingdom, reportedly costing about $97 000 in official travel expenses. By January 2026 the department had been moved out of her office.
The shift was later reflected in the 2026/27 national budget. Parliament approved an allocation of K6.81bn ($3.9m) for the office of the vice-president, a reduction from the previous year.
During parliamentary debate, Dedza MP Joshua Malango warned that the reduced allocation could affect critical functions including disaster management.
Finance minister Joseph Mwanamvekha said the cut was structural and linked to the transfer of public sector reform responsibilities to OPC. The bureaucratic adjustment matters because DoDMA sits at the centre of Malawi’s crisis-response architecture.
The agency coordinates humanitarian and disaster response nationwide, working with the United Nations, the Red Cross and international NGOs across the country’s 18 local councils. Its institutional location therefore carries real operational consequences – particularly at a moment when Malawi is facing escalating climate shocks.
Since the start of the 2025/2026 rainy season, floods have affected more than 160 000 people. Several dozen deaths have been reported, while repeated flooding has displaced thousands of households, particularly in the Nkhotakota district.
At the same time, the government has declared a nationwide state of disaster as roughly four million Malawians face acute food insecurity during the lean season. Against this backdrop, the transfer of DoDMA occurred precisely as the flood season intensified.
Changing reporting lines and administrative structures in the middle of an emergency response is generally viewed by governance specialists as risky.
Whether the reorganisation has affected operational performance remains unclear. But the timing alone has raised concerns among governance observers. Malawi has seen similar institutional manoeuvres before.
In 2020, during his first term, Mutharika removed DoDMA from the office of the vice-president following the constitutional court’s reinstatement of then–vice president Saulos Chilima after the disputed 2019 election was annulled.
At the time, the department was elevated into a standalone ministry – a move widely interpreted as an attempt to limit Chilima’s political influence.
The current situation is different in one important respect. Ansah is not a political rival with an independent support base. She is Mutharika’s running mate and a former chairperson of the Malawi Electoral Commission who presided over the disputed 2019 vote.
Her political position is therefore closely tied to the presidency. That makes the current restructuring analytically unusual. If the aim were to contain a political challenger, Ansah would be an unlikely target.
The drivers may instead lie elsewhere: the political fallout from the Nottingham travel controversy, factional dynamics within the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), or a governing style that gravitates toward centralisation when under pressure.
Malawi’s constitutional framework gives the vice president limited institutional independence. Section 79 states that the vice-president exercises powers conferred by the constitution, by legislation and by the president. In practice, this means the vice-president’s substantive responsibilities exist largely at presidential discretion.
The OPC statement emphasised that Ansah “continues to fully discharge her constitutional duties, including participating in Cabinet meetings.”
But in practical governance terms, cabinet attendance does not necessarily translate into real administrative authority. A vice-president can remain formally in office while gradually losing operational responsibilities. The episode also comes at a sensitive moment for Malawi’s economic diplomacy.
When Mutharika returned to power in September 2025, he inherited an economy under severe strain. Inflation remained above 24% at the start of 2026 and public finances are under intense pressure.
The 2026/27 national budget projects a fiscal deficit of about 9% of GDP. The government has introduced austerity measures including reductions in ministerial fuel allocations, limits on vehicle purchases and cuts to embassy staffing. External partners are watching closely.
Malawi’s $175m International Monetary Fund (IMF) extended credit facility expired in May 2024 without completing a single programme review. The government is now seeking to negotiate a new IMF arrangement.
Without one, major donors are unlikely to resume direct budget support. In November 2025, World Bank vice president for eastern and southern Africa Ndiame Diop warned that providing budget support without macroeconomic stability would be “like putting money into a leaking bucket”.
This article was made possible by a partnership with the Centre for Investigative Journalism Malawi
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