Strait of Hormuz Under Threat of Mines: Are Littoral Combat Ships the Solution?

Source: DVIDS

USS Canberra (LCS 30) escorts merchant vessel Seaway Hawk, transporting four decommissioned Avenger-class Mine Countermeasures Ships

The Context

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a joint military operation against Iran. The conflict that followed has caused a tremendous strain on the global energy market and consequently placed a major spotlight on one of the world’s most critical waterways, the Strait of Hormuz. The importance of this chokepoint along Iran’s coast is not to be discounted, given that an estimated 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) normally passes through the Strait. Following a March 2nd declaration of the Strait’s closure from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), exports were effectively halted, leading energy prices to surge across the globe.

The Threat Landscape

A key pillar of its military strategy, Tehran has ‌long ⁠threatened to mine the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation against any military attacks. One need only look at the Iran-Iraq “Tanker War” in the late 1980s for examples of mine warfare utilized against commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf. According to a March 2026 congressional report, Iran is believed to possess roughly 6,000 naval mines, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) has hundreds of speed boats with which to rapidly deploy mines across the narrow waterway.

Despite a declaration from CENTCOM Commander, Admiral Brad Cooper, that Iran’s conventional navy has been rendered combat ineffective, some reports indicate that, as of mid-March 2026, Iran has deployed mines in the Strait of Hormuz. The extent to which Iran placed mines in the Strait has not been confirmed, yet even the threat of mines is enough to halt tanker traffic and raise insurance costs prohibitively. Moreover, Iranian missiles, one-way-attack drones, and explosive-laden uncrewed boats further complicate the threat picture for any vessels, commercial or otherwise, seeking to navigate the Strait.

Potential Solutions

The threat of mines in the Strait presents a unique opportunity for the U.S. Navy to leverage its latest naval mine warfare apparatus, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The LCS is a high-speed, agile surface combatant designed to operate in near-shore environments and perform surface warfare, anti-submarine operations, and mine countermeasures. After years of debate around the costs, capabilities, and early retirements of LCSs, the Navy plans to give them renewed purpose in mine warfare.

For decades, the backbone of the U.S. mine warfare fleet had been the Avenger-class minesweepers. These ships, purpose-built for mine warfare, have wooden hulls wrapped in fiberglass to reduce magnetic signatures that trigger mines. However, the Avenger-class ships, built in the 1980s, are slow, outdated, lack any meaningful self-defense systems, and can’t launch helicopters or unmanned systems. As of March 2026, only four Avenger-class ships remain in service. Previously, the U.S. Navy had four Avenger-class minesweepers stationed in Bahrain, but these were decommissioned in September 2025 and replaced with Littoral Combat Ships equipped with minesweeping and mine-hunting capabilities via the LCS Mine Countermeasures (MCM) Mission Package (MP).

How Does the LCS Combat Mines?

The LCS MCM MP supports mine warfare operations using aviation assets and unmanned systems equipped with an array of sensors to detect, localize, and neutralize surface, near-surface, moored, and bottom mines in the littorals. Notably, the LCS MCM MP is exclusively employed on the Independence-variant LCSs. To date, the USS Canberra (LCS 30), USS Santa Barbara (LCS 32), and USS Tulsa (LCS 16) are known to have received the MCM MP. A fourth LCS, the USS Kansas City (LCS 22), is equipped with MCM MP for crew training and relief support.

Unlike Avenger-class ships, purpose-built for mine warfare, Independence-class LCSs have aluminum hulls and thus must operate outside a mine threat zone. However, the LCS MCM MP leverages MH-60S Seahawks, unmanned surface vessels (USVs), and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to venture into threat zones and remove mines.

USVs launched from an LCS can tow the AN/AQS-20 mine-hunting sonar system, which uses sensors to pinpoint the location of bottom mines and moored mines. The USVs can also deploy the unmanned influence sweep system (UISS), which mimics the magnetic and acoustic signature of a ship to detonate mines safely. In addition, LCSs can deploy the Knifefish UUV, which can find buried and proud mines using low-frequency broadband sonar.

Providing mine hunting and minesweeping capabilities from the air, MH-60S Seahawks can be equipped with the AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS), which detects floating and near-surface moored mines, as well as the AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine-Neutralization System (AMNS), which sends an expendable Archerfish UUV to intercept and destroy mines.

A Viable Option?

Given that U.S. counter-mine operations now rely on four remaining Averger-class minesweepers and three modified Independence-class LCSs, it’s worth asking how these assets could be used to clear mines in the Strait of Hormuz.

As of March 2026, the four Avenger-class ships still in service are all forward-deployed in Japan. Meanwhile, the USS Tulsa and USS Santa Barbara were spotted at port in Malaysia on March 15, 2026, reportedly conducting brief logistical stops. The USS Canberra was reportedly in the Indian Ocean around the same time. The absence of these vessels in the Persian Gulf is surely no accident. Moving U.S. warships, particularly the three LCSs, out of port in Bahrain ahead of the conflict was likely a calculated decision to keep these vessels well out of the range of Iranian drones and missiles. Moreover, the U.S. military’s strikes on Iranian vessels in port have demonstrated the vulnerability of ships docked in the Gulf.

Yet, even if the LCSs are repositioned to the Persian Gulf, there are genuine concerns around the capability and viability of the LCS MCM MP. For example, the unmanned assets require hours of pre-mission calibration before launch and have a limited range, requiring the LCS to maintain line of sight with the USV and operate near or within the mine zone. In addition, the AN/AQS-20 has had challenges visually confirming mines, even when tested in the relatively benign waters of Southern California. Perhaps most concerning, in a March 2026 report, the Pentagon’s testing wing revealed it could not determine the operational effectiveness of the LCS equipped with the MCM MP. Overall, the greatest disadvantage for the LCSs is that they were not purpose-built for mine countermeasures like the Avenger-class.

Conclusion

Ultimately, mine-clearing is a slow, deliberate process made even more arduous when occurring in an environment contested by Iranian missiles and drones. Neither the purpose-built Avenger-class nor the LCS equipped with a relatively unproven MCM mission package would likely prove effective without a robust military escort. Alternatively, MCM assistance could be sourced from U.S. allies with their own counter-mine capabilities. However, the current political climate shows this outcome is unlikely.

The U.S. Navy could clearly benefit from a new class of dedicated mine warfare ships, yet the cost of such an endeavor is likely to prohibit its execution. Much more likely is the outcome in which the Navy continues to test and enhance the MCM capabilities of its unmanned assets, which will take years. One thing is for certain, though: the crisis taking place in the Strait of Hormuz has exposed a considerable gap in U.S. mine warfare capability.