The three main changes in the Short-Term Plan were to re-organise Army HQ, appoint a Head of Change, and establish a single Credible Armoured Brigade (CAB).
This post will examine the more complex Medium Term Plan (MTP), for the non-Field Army parts of the British Army
Medium-term is 2-5 years, a period recently defined by the head of Strategic Command recently as, ‘Next’.
Questions of British Army form always come back to British Army function.
Many commenters expect perfect clarity to underpin a perfect force design and perfect equipment plan.
It is quite easy to find advocates for conventional power in Europe, fighting Chinese proxies under the threshold in Africa for the next ten years, or filling sandbags in Somerset.
It remains superficially tempting to think we can do one and ignore the others, but we cannot, however comforting it might appear.
It would be a grave mistake if the British Army over-optimised for one threat.
This Medium Term Plan is therefore about building a modernised force that is both achievable but also not overly optimised.
Expanding on the organisational chart in the previous posts, this one will cover DGCS, Capability, ARRC, and although not shown on the diagram, the British Army’s contribution to Strategic Command.
In the proposals below, the following key is used for ORBAT diagrams.
The first of these proposals are about peoples and equipment, then organisational structures to maintain standing capabilities.
Deputy CGS
The DGGS would be responsible for
- Civil Resilience
- London
- Regions
- Army Legal Services
- Provost Marshal (Army)
There is no avoiding civil resilience tasks, although their priority will wax and wane, and usage, is obviously dependent on external events. Closely linked with the Regional Points of Command and London District, this would be a specialist skills and command group to coordinate across the UK for civil resilience duties.
Any notion of the Army getting out of the ceremonial and public duties is simply not in the realms of political possibility. With the new King, there might be scope for rationalisation.
A new regiment specifically for public duties and state ceremonial, incorporating regular and reserve personnel from the UK and overseas, and incorporating foot and mounted teams (including the London Regiment, Guards Battalion on rotation, Household Cavalry and Kings Troop Royal Artillery). A support battalion would provide veterinary, transport and equipment support for the regiment.
I can hear the howls from here!
All the Household and Regional bands would also be merged into a single group.
The Regional Points of Contact mirror the UK ITL 1 boundaries, aligned with Regional Resilience forums and partnerships, 13 in total, although the Army combines the East and West Midlands, and North West and North East.
Army Legal Services and 1 Royal Military Police Group would remain as per Future Soldier
Proposed Orbat
Capability
The 3* Director Capability would be primarily responsible for equipment and training, organised in four, 2* functions.
- Recruitment
- Initial Training
- Continuous Learning
- Army Business Unit
Recruitment
Recruitment and selection for both officers and other ranks would be a combined group, not combined with initial training and RMAS Sandhurst.
Its importance to the British Army warrants a separate and dedicated group, utilising the Army Reserve estate, defence media and the network of combined recruiting locations.
Initial Training
All soldiers, regular and reserve, will go through a common military syllabus, delivered by the Initial Training Group at the British Army Soldier Academy at Pirbright, as planned in Future Soldier.
In a change from current practice, this would also apply to officers and infantry soldiers, everyone in the British Army would start from the same point.
Continuous Learning
The Continuous Learning Group would be quite large, responsible for taking the trained soldier and officer from initial training, and then moving them through the learning pipeline from the start to the end of their careers.
Initial and Subsequent Training; all the various schools, colleges and training establishments, the Army Adventurous Training Group, RMAS Sandhurst, the General Staff Centre, the Centre for Army Leadership and the University Officer Training Corps. Moving RMAS Sandhurst into this group is a significant change. It would also have a dotted line into the Army Business Unit Concepts and Requirements Group.
The Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research would also be tasked with providing the ABU Concepts and Requirements Group with comprehensive historic equipment and organisational programmes analysis and briefing notes. Hopefully, this would go some way to stopping the British Army from forgetting things it has done in the past.
Education and Training Service (ETS)
Readiness Group
This would combine the existing Collective Training Group and Mission Ready Training Centre (MRTC) with some of the new Combat Manoeuvre Centre (with other elements going to the Army Business Unit Concepts and Requirements Group).
Its function is to develop and maintain readiness for operations through individual and collective training at scale, utilising the overseas training estate and allies’ locations and facilities.
Wargaming, online combat gaming and a simulation centre would also be established within the readiness group.
Army Business Unit
It is a statement of the blindingly obvious but the British Army simply has to get better at developing, maintaining and delivering a coherent equipment plan.
Issues
Many will counter that the Army does not control Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), it does not define the financial rules under which public spending is managed, it does not write the Land Industrial Strategy, and the defence Land sector does not have a significant export market.
The levers of improvement are not wholly owned by it and no amount of hand waving will solve this.
All true.
But, it can apply influence, it can be a more demanding customer of DE&S, it can have conceptual and force design stability, it can get the attention of those in Main Building, it can get its own house in order, and it can take seriously the Land Industrial Strategy.
If the average programme length is 77 months, and the average Senior Responsible Owner has 22 months in post, how is it possible that the programme can avoid the corrosive effect of too much change?
One of the most consistent themes in the oceans of analysis completed on this subject in the last two or three decades is that of developing applicable skills with suitably qualified and experienced personnel with some degree of longevity in the role.
It is always about people.
The innovation landscape in the MoD is, no surprise, quite complex. JHub in Strategic Command, Ploughshare, DSTL, the Defence Battle Lab, and the Defence and Security Accelerator, The British Army has the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research, the Army, Research, Innovation and Experimentation Laboratory (ARIEL), Defence Ideas, and the Experimentation and Trials Group, including all the individual trials and development units.
Proposal
Establish an Army Business Unit with three objectives
- In conjunction with allies, industry, DE&S, and others, manage the Army’s equipment and capability lifecycle
- Deliver change programmes and projects
- Develop and Maintain a Readiness Reporting System
Like the Head of Change, the Head of the Army Business Unit should be an external appointment with long-term tenure and stability in the role, and with a skill set not born of a short course and 2-year posting, this is not a transient posting for someone on their way to CGS.
Making it an external appointment is another plank in the ‘being seen to change’ strategy.
The CADMID lifecycle is shown below.
At the front end, all of the Army’s conceptual development capability would fall under the remit of the Concepts and Requirements Group, with a dotted-line relationship to the joint Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), and the Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research (CHACR), which should remain independent.
A key feature of this group is that it would have representatives from allies and industry.
Any emerging concept should be subject to a sense check, asking two question
- Are there opportunities to align and cooperate with allies?
- Is it within the realms of achievability?
Coordination and alignment will not always be possible but they should be maximised and many of the problems the Army has are a result of a lack of realism about time, cost and performance.
Innovation is also not just about new things, it could equally be about how to maintain or develop existing capabilities, and the use of spiral development should be encouraged against any new programme, with objectives defined at the concept and assessment stage.
Only deep subject matter experts can make these realism assessments and this is another area where the ABU would develop a skills hub for relevant technologies, working with DSTL and DE&S.
All of the existing Trials and Development Units would be combined into a single group, as per Future Soldier, but in the ABU, not the Land Warfare Centre.
This is an area where reservist skills should be utilised.
The Army, Research, Innovation and Experimentation Laboratory (ARIEL) and Defence Ideas, would be split across the two.
Rather than endless and fruitless experimentation, often sending taxpayers money overseas when onshore capability exists, the ABU would define a number of programmes that utilise a joint Army/industry development model, generating a Technical Data Package such that manufacturing contracts can be let separately or licenced abroad as export opportunities.
The Senior Responsible Owners Group would be responsible for the delivery of new capabilities.
The ABU should also seek to develop in-house technical and management skills and end the short post-cycle for programmes and project management.
If the Army cannot develop a suitable career and engagement model for Senior Responsible Owners (SRO) in the Army Business Unit then it should simply be side-lined by the Unit lead and more external candidates assigned.
Being an SRO is a career, not a posting.
The Projects Group will be responsible for a number of self-contained activities.
It would be responsible for delivering the published change programme and reporting progress to ministers and the Army leadership, including a readiness and material state dashboard.
Within a year develop and pilot trial the following, ready for an investment decision the year after.
- A car park pass replacement system
- Options to replace or modify PAYD
- Cat C Licence for all at Phase 2 Training
- Removal of Whole Fleet Management
- Garrison-based estate maintenance and public transport facility using a veteran-owned Community Interest Company
- An Integrated Readiness, Condition and Stock Level Reporting Dashboard for Ministers
A comprehensive review of standards should also be completed within the 2-5 year period, with the objective of simplification and reduction of barriers to entry for SMEs.
Proposed ORBAT
Strategic Command
The role of the British Army in Strategic Command (formerly Joint Forces Command) is often overlooked in online discourse but it is crucial nonetheless.
With 25,000 people, Strategic Command is a large component of the MoD, but if one looks at its organisation chart, it is far too complex, like the British Army.
Slightly out of scope for this series, simplification here would not go amiss either.
Joint Overseas Assistance Group
The value of overseas capability development should always be questioned because it consumes finite resources, everything must earn its place.
Overseas capability development is a strategic objective that needs a joint approach, not one that each of the single services does in isolation.
It must also include strong links with other parts of government, industry and academia.
It starts with education
One of the lessons from Ukraine is just how quickly motivated soldiers with a solid education can absorb technical training and develop their own capabilities.
Yet most of our overseas force development seems to concentrate on a relatively narrow band of skills with little or no element of basic or technical education.
It must include industry and academia
Overseas capability development would also have a permanent presence with the Army Business Unit given the importance of equipment delivery to partners through the UK industry wherever possible.
Train and Assist
Despite the unforced error of the cap badge, I think the Rangers are actually a reasonable concept. They will take on a number of roles that were previously fulfilled by special forces to free them up for higher priority tasks and allow us to apply influence early in the conflict cycle.
For overseas capability development, we cannot afford BOTH the Army Special Operations Brigade and Security Force Assistance Brigade as constituted.
Whilst the two are different, they are sufficiently similar to warrant delivery in a single organisation.
There also exists potential to make greater use of contractors and Retained Reserves to deliver much of this, it is a valuable capability but we should have a much more hard-nosed view of how it can be delivered given our need for more mass in the field army.
Proposal
To coordinate all overseas capability development activity, establish a new Joint Overseas Assistance Group within Strategic Command.
The Army’s contribution would be a single brigade-sized force comprising the following.
- Headquarters and support group with medical, ISTAR, military working dogs, combat engineering and C-UAS capabilities, together with outreach and cultural support, and finally, Counter Terrorist Training
- Three battalions of specialist infantry that can both train and accompany host nation forces
- Army Business Unit team to provide a conduit between allies and UK finance and industry. There is no subterfuge here, their objective being to develop commercial opportunities for the UK defence industry.
- Combat Support and Combat Service Support Training Team
- Basic Skills Education Team with an emphasis on literacy and numeracy
The existing Army Special Operations Brigade and Security Force Assistance Brigade would be disbanded, with some personnel joining the new Joint Overseas Assistance Group.
All personnel joining the new brigade must have a second language or be working on acquiring one.
Rangers would no longer be a cap badge, but instead, a qualification, open to all arms, and a pre-requisite of joining. Once a tour had been completed, those skills would be utilised by the field Army to ensure a broad-based improvement in quality, or it could be used as a transition step towards Special Forces.
Not all personnel in the group would require Ranger qualification.
To summarise
This is a proposal that recognises…
- Value of overseas capability development
- The need to include education and technical training, and business development
- The negative impacts of too many specialist units
- A requirement to recover some mass into the field Army
Joint Special Forces and Support Group
This is generally not a subject I usually go anywhere near but it appears to me that it is a genuine strength that should be reinforced but also one that can be a double-edged sword.
Issues and Gaps
Too many specialised units draw talent from the field army and reduce mass in the centre
Careful oversight is also required because of the less public visibility and higher levels of reporting secrecy, there have been numerous examples in NATO and the wider Western world of special forces excess.
Joint Personnel Recovery is an obvious capability gap that could be developed further.
Parachuting capability is an emotive subject. Its detractors see it as an anachronism, reinforced by its infrequent use and Russian parachute forces getting a massive kicking in Ukraine. Because of this, the political risk, and therefore decision-making on its use, is increasingly unlikely to be held at the Army level.
This excellent Wavell Room article describes the problem really well.
There is also the obvious problem of having parachutists with not enough aircraft, and for those aircraft that do remain, their ongoing issues.
Yet the French example in Mali of using parachute forces to open an airfield is a good example of their utility.
Whilst the image got the headlines, what was more important was the image below.
This a perfect illustration of a niche capability, but one that is critical.
Proposal
As recently argued in the follow-up to the linked Wavell Room article above, moving the parachute capability to a lower risk threshold area of the joint force will enable its ongoing development and use.
I agree
The Parachute regiment en-masse would be moved into the Special Forces Support Group, noting that 1 PARA is already there.
4 PARA (Reserve) would be disbanded as a formed unit, although some reserve establishment may be retained for specialist roles.
The enlarged SF Support Group would be also tasked with developing and maintaining a Joint Personnel Recovery capability, and a number of additional specialist parachute-enabled functions, especially airfield opening, air traffic control, medical and ISTAR.
The tactical air landing capability would be retained by this enlarged group.
A new Battalion Support Group would be established (not dissimilar to the Gurkha ARRC Support Battalion) that would incorporate a range of CS/CSS capabilities, notably combat engineering, medical, logistics, indirect fire, and ISTAR.
That might seem like a broad span of capabilities for a single support battalion, and it is, but their scale is not the same as 16 AAB.
16 Air Assault Brigade would be disbanded (more on this later)
As described in this post, developing a modest utility fixed-wing aviation component would not only provide additional speed and reach for this group, and it would also enable parachuting qualification to be maintained economically.
A new Army Air Corps squadron would be established to develop this.
Finally, an external civilian governance framework for these functions would be developed, potentially involving the Defence Select Committee.
Proposed ORBAT
HQ ARRC
NATO headquarters and commands are relatively complex, and like any alliance, somewhat beholden to alliance politics and national prestige.
The US always provides fills the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and by tradition, the UK generally covers the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR).
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has nine Graduated Readiness Forces (Land) Headquarters under Operational Command, one of which is HQ ARRC.
With a history going back to 1 (British) Corps, HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) is a 3* HQ and command function that can operate as a Corps HQ, a Land Force Component Command and a Joint Task Force HQ
It also assumed the role of NATO Response Force (NRF) Land Component Command on a rotational basis.
Although it is multinational, the British Army hosts ARRC HQ at Imjin Barracks in Gloucestershire and provides approximately 60% of the personnel, including a logistics brigade and a signals brigade (although those brigades are not just for HQ ARRC)
The Gurkha ARRC Support Battalion is also an interesting case study in establishing a UA Army-style combined support function
There is no doubt that HQ ARRC retains a strong reputation in NATO, but as the British Army gets progressively smaller, others such as Poland expand, and new members join, I expect HQ ARRC will come under political pressure, as will the DSACEUR position.
The question for the UK is a simple one, does it continue with DSACEUR and maintain HQ ARRC or does it put all its alliance capital into the maritime component?
In general though, even with recent expansion, I think there is little scope for change with HQ ARRC
Proposed ORBAT (no change)
As always, see you in the comments…