As the war in Ukraine grinds into another brutal year, the administration of former US President Donald Trump is quietly exploring what it believes could be the central trade in any eventual settlement: territory and security guarantees for Ukraine on one side, and economic normalization for Russia on the other.
At the heart of that economic normalization lies an explosive possibility — the revival of Nord Stream 2 AG and the broader Nord Stream system linking Russia directly to Germany under the Baltic Sea.
If the White House can persuade Moscow that a negotiated peace is more profitable than a grinding military campaign, the thinking goes, it may be able to reshape not just the battlefield in Ukraine but the geopolitical architecture of Europe itself. But doing so would require pressuring Kyiv, outmaneuvering European allies, and navigating a thicket of sanctions, domestic politics and strategic mistrust.
The administration’s problem in Kyiv is more political than military. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has insisted that elections cannot be held under martial law and that the war must end on Ukrainian terms. He has publicly signaled that Ukraine is prepared for a prolonged fight.
For Washington, however, time is a finite resource. If Trump calculates that he has a narrow window to broker a deal — before domestic politics in the United States or shifting battlefield realities foreclose the opportunity — he will need leverage.
That leverage exists. The United States supplies critical arms, financial support and intelligence that underpin Ukraine’s defensive capacity. The mere threat of withholding high-end weapons systems or battlefield intelligence could dramatically alter Kyiv’s negotiating posture.
But forcing political change in Ukraine — whether through internal realignment or elite pressure — would be extraordinarily risky. It would invite accusations of betrayal and fracture the Western coalition. And yet, from a purely transactional standpoint, Washington may conclude that Ukrainian leadership must be aligned with whatever framework it strikes with Moscow.
If Kyiv presents a political puzzle, Moscow presents an economic one.
Russia’s economy has proven more resilient than many Western analysts predicted after the 2022 invasion. Yet it is under strain. Oil and gas revenues remain the backbone of Russian export earnings, accounting for roughly 40 to 50 percent of export value. Sanctions, price caps and shipping restrictions have significantly constrained Moscow’s access to Western markets.
Here, the Trump team sees opportunity. The offer: phased relief from US sanctions on Russian oil and gas, renewed Western investment and — most controversially — a pathway for Russian natural gas to re-enter Europe.
The most powerful symbol of that possibility is Nord Stream.
On September 26, 2022, underwater explosions severely damaged the twin pipelines of Nord Stream 1 and one string of Nord Stream 2. The sabotage effectively ended direct Russian gas deliveries to Germany through the Baltic corridor.
Nord Stream 1’s two lines were rendered inoperable. Nord Stream 2 suffered partial damage; one string remains intact. Russian officials have periodically claimed that the intact line could be restored to operation within a year, should Germany grant approval.
Before the war, Russian pipeline gas was central to Germany’s industrial model — cheap, abundant and geopolitically controversial. After the explosions and sanctions, Berlin pivoted sharply to liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports and expanded pipeline flows from Norway.
Today, roughly 16–17 percent of Germany’s gas consumption comes via LNG, more than 90 percent of which originates in the United States. Another 46 percent comes from Norway by pipeline. Russian supplies have effectively vanished.
Yet Russian gas delivered by pipeline would likely be cheaper than both LNG and Norwegian supply. Nord Stream 2 alone was designed to deliver 55 billion cubic meters annually — enough to heat tens of millions of homes and power key industrial sectors.
Restarting Nord Stream 2 is not merely an engineering problem. It is a legal and political minefield.
EU sanctions — including Regulation (EU) 2026/261 — restrict Russian energy imports. German law, under measures such as the Energy Security Act (EnSiG) and the Energy Industry Act (EnWG), has further tightened oversight of critical infrastructure. Berlin has effectively seized onshore processing facilities connected to Nord Stream 2, a move Moscow and associated stakeholders have described as a hostile takeover.
The German government is also reportedly tightening foreign trade rules to prevent strategic acquisitions of energy infrastructure by Russian or foreign entities.
Against this backdrop, reports in outlets such as Berliner Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, Le Monde and Les Echos have suggested that figures connected to Trump-world and private investors have explored scenarios for acquiring Nord Stream 2 AG, currently 100 percent owned by Russia’s Gazprom.
The concept is striking: US-linked investors would purchase Gazprom’s shares in Nord Stream 2 AG, thereby becoming legal owners of the pipeline infrastructure — though not the gas flowing through it. In theory, this would allow Washington to mediate the return of Russian gas to Germany under a new ownership structure.
Several names have surfaced in European reporting.
Richard Grenell, Trump’s former ambassador to Germany and a trusted envoy, is alleged to have visited Switzerland to explore options. Grenell has publicly denied involvement.
Matthias Warnig, the former managing director of Nord Stream 2 and a longtime associate of Vladimir Putin, is reportedly part of discussions about post-sanctions arrangements. Warnig’s background in East Germany’s security services during the Cold War adds further intrigue.
On the US investor side, Stephen P. Lynch, a Republican donor specializing in distressed assets, has sought US government approval to purchase the pipeline through his firm. Former ambassador Edward McMullen and Texas investor Gentry Beach have also been mentioned.
The precise contours of any proposal remain opaque. But the strategic logic is clear: use ownership restructuring to create political space for Russian gas to re-enter Europe under US-supervised conditions.
Even if Washington and Moscow reached agreement, Berlin holds a veto.
Germany’s current government strongly opposes restoring Russian pipeline gas. Officials argue that dependence on Moscow was a strategic error and that the war demonstrated the danger of energy leverage.
But Germany’s economy has struggled under high energy costs. Its industrial core — from automobiles to chemicals — has been squeezed. Bavaria, home to giants such as BMW, Audi, Siemens and Allianz, feels the strain acutely.
The center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), led by Friedrich Merz, has maintained a hard line against Russian gas. Its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), is more pragmatic, reflecting industrial pressures.
Meanwhile, the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), which won 20.8 percent in the February 2025 federal election, openly supports resuming Russian gas imports and ending military support for Ukraine. Though labeled extremist by Germany’s political establishment, its electoral strength complicates Berlin’s calculus.
Is Washington betting on a shift in German politics — perhaps a CDU-CSU-led coalition more open to compromise? That remains speculative. But without a change in Berlin’s stance, any Nord Stream resurrection faces formidable resistance.
For Europe’s “Big Three” — the UK, France and Germany — Russia represents an existential security threat. Leaders argue that settling the Ukraine war prematurely risks freezing Russian gains and moving the frontline closer to NATO territory.
Some European policymakers openly discuss strengthening continental military capacity independent of the United States. The specter of European nuclear autonomy — once unthinkable — is occasionally raised in strategic debates.
From this vantage point, a US-Russia bargain over Ukraine could appear as a betrayal, potentially weakening NATO cohesion and empowering Moscow.
The United States views the strategic map differently. In Asia, it faces the accelerating rise of China. American economic prosperity is deeply intertwined with Indo-Pacific stability. A conflict over Taiwan would carry catastrophic implications.
If Washington can stabilize Europe through a negotiated settlement with Russia, it can redirect military and diplomatic bandwidth toward the Pacific.
This divergence — Europe’s fixation on Russia versus America’s prioritization of China — underpins much of the current tension.
For Moscow, the prize is clear: renewed access to European energy markets, Western capital and long-term economic normalization. For Washington, the reward is strategic flexibility and a diplomatic achievement.
- EU sanctions would need modification or suspension.
- Germany would have to authorize operational changes.
- Legal disputes over seized infrastructure would require resolution.
- Political backlash across Europe could be severe.
- Ukraine’s acceptance of any territorial compromise remains uncertain.
Even if Nord Stream 2 were transferred to US-linked ownership, the symbolism of reviving a pipeline synonymous with Europe’s pre-war dependency on Russia would ignite controversy.
Ultimately, a Nord Stream-based incentive will mean little without a broader transformation in European politics. As long as Brussels and major European capitals remain committed to isolating Russian energy, any bilateral US-Russia deal will lack practical effect.
The war in Ukraine is not just a territorial conflict. It is a crucible for competing visions of Europe’s future security order.
Trump’s wager appears to be that economic incentives — especially energy — can unlock diplomatic compromise. Whether that bet succeeds depends on variables far beyond Washington’s control: Russian calculations, Ukrainian resilience, German politics and Europe’s strategic identity.
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