SINGAPORE: A teenager who allegedly drove multiple cars, including his grandmother’s, while underage and uninsured was handed 18 charges on Thursday (May 28).

The 18-year-old had been arrested after a high-speed police chase in which he collided with six vehicles before fleeing on foot.

The teen cannot be named under the Children and Young Persons Act as he was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged offences.

According to a police statement, the teen was involved in three separate cases of underage driving.

The first was on Jan 30, 2025, when the then-sixteen-year-old allegedly took his grandmother’s car without her knowledge, as the ignition key was in the unlocked vehicle.

He drove for about one hour before returning the vehicle, the police said.

His grandmother called for police assistance after discovering her car missing.

About a year later, on Jan 8 this year, the police discovered that the teen had driven a deregistered vehicle with a false number plate from Haig Road to Marina Bay Sands.

A week later at about 10.50pm on Jan 16, traffic police officers on patrol along Paya Lebar Road began pursuit of the teen when he sped off in a car upon seeing them.

He was 17 when he allegedly drove at high speed during the pursuit, reaching 174kmh on the East Coast Parkway and 96kmh along Guillemard Road.

The speed limits were 90kmh and 40kmh respectively.

The police said he also ran red lights and drove against the flow of traffic.

The teen allegedly collided with five stationary vehicles along Paya Lebar Road and Guillemard Road, eventually stopping after hitting a sixth stationary car at Marine Parade Road and Still Road South.

He got out on foot to flee but was arrested.

The vehicle the teen was driving in this third incident was found to be a deregistered car bearing a false number plate.

A vaporiser and a pod were found in the car, but no further action was taken in this respect as there was insufficient evidence, the police said.

The teen was charged with multiple offences, including dangerous driving causing hurt, driving while underage, using a deregistered vehicle, using a vehicle without insurance coverage and failing to stop after an accident.

He indicated that he would be pleading guilty and was given a date to do so in July.

Of the penalties he faces, the heftiest is for dangerous driving causing hurt – for which he can be jailed for up to two years, fined up to S$10,000, or both.

A convicted paedophile has been jailed for 4½ years for committing obscene acts against a seven-year-old boy while working as a private tutor in Hong Kong more than two years ago.

Ng Tin-yu, 24, was sentenced on Wednesday for repeatedly molesting the boy at the latter’s home in Kowloon City until a surveillance camera on the premises captured one of the incidents, leading to the defendant’s arrest.

He pleaded guilty earlier this month to nine counts of committing an act of gross indecency towards a child under 16 at Tsuen Wan Court, which now handles District Court cases.

Prosecutors agreed not to pursue four other indecency charges following a plea bargain.

A prosecution case summary said the boy’s parents were out working whenever Ng went to the boy’s residence to help with his homework. The family’s domestic helper, who was also at home at the time, had been unaware of the incidents.

Global appetite for building AI data centers is pushing up demand and prices for many critical components from lasers and substrates to optical fibers and connectors. (Photo by Chungi Chen)

The Liancourt Rocks, known to Koreans as Dokdo, and to Japanese as Takeshima, are a pair of lonely, wind-swept volcanic islets in the waters between the Korean Peninsula and Japan. For decades, the territorial dispute between Seoul and Tokyo over these rocks played out through official statements and government posturing. But for South Koreans, Dokdo has never been just territory. It is a potent symbol of national liberation and the final clearing of the shadow cast by the Japanese colonial occupation (1910–1945). And today, that symbolism is no longer confined to state narratives – it is spreading across algorithmic feeds on TikTok and Instagram.

If you scroll through the “DokdoKorea” accounts across social media, you won’t find grainy archival footage or government-sponsored documentaries. Instead, you are met with the polished aesthetic of K-Pop. One particular track – mimicking the Oscar-winning song “Golden” – has already amassed over a million views on YouTube alone. The vocals are flawless, the hook is infectious, and synced perfectly with the high-energy beat.

But there is a twist: none of it is real. The singer doesn’t exist, the melody was composed in seconds, and the lyrics – rich with specific dates from 6th-century chronicles – were synthesized by artificial intelligence. This is the perfect example of digital nationalism with the usage of AI.

Across platforms like YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok, the “DokdoKorea” initiative has generated nearly 20 million views. By parasitizing global pop culture trends and the massive emotional reach of K-Pop fandoms, the creators are doing what state-led public diplomacy has failed to do for years: making a territorial dispute “viral” for younger generations.

This isn’t just a new form of fan-art; it is a sophisticated, low-cost, and highly effective model of grassroots and nationalistic politics of memory. In an era where generative AI can turn a historical grievance into a chart-topping bop, the battle for sovereignty is no longer just being fought with naval charts and exchanges of diplomatic statements – it’s being fought for “likes,” “views,” and the perfect digital “flow.”

This grassroots surge stands in contrast to South Korea’s traditional infrastructure of memory. For years, the state has institutionalized the Dokdo narrative through specialized law, museums, institutes, and school curricula. 

The success of the “DokdoKorea” initiative is not a result of a sudden change in historical facts or changes in Korean memory, but a radical pivot in technological delivery. For eight years, the YouTube channel remained a relatively obscure corner of the internet, likely struggling with the high production costs and slow turnaround of traditional video editing and songwriting. That changed just months ago. By adopting generative AI tools for both music and visuals, the creators bypassed the bottleneck of human production, launching a digital blitzkrieg across TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube.

In this new model, the creation of nationalistic content is no longer a labor-intensive process reserved for state-funded broadcasters. Instead, it is a low-cost, high-frequency operation. The numbers speak for themselves: with just 20 full-length AI songs and a handful of Shorts, the channel has garnered over 8 million views on YouTube and next to 10 million views on TikTok and Instagram. The logic is simple: if the algorithm demands constant novelty, AI provides the infinite supply.

The idea of AI-generated tracks lies in their lyrical dissonance. While the music sounds like a chart-topping B-side from a Seoul production house, the lyrics function as a dense, rhythmic legal brief. These are not vague songs about “loving the motherland”; they are precise, pedagogical tools designed to weaponize history.

A recurring motif across the discography is a chronological “litany of proof.” In tracks that mimic the staccato delivery of modern K-rap, the AI-generated lyrics weave a tapestry of specific dates: 512 CE (the incorporation of islets into the Silla Kingdom), 1454 (King Sejong’s chronicles indicating Korean sovereignty), or 1877 (the Dajokan order, where Japan’s own Council of State admitted the islands were not Japanese territory). By embedding these dates into high-tempo hooks, the creators are effectively rote-teaching complex history to a wide audience, reinforcing the Korean narratives about the disputed islands.

Central to this grassroots narrative is the elevation of the “commoner-hero.” The songs frequently bypass high-ranking generals to focus on figures like An Yong-bok, a 17th-century fisherman who traveled to Japan to protest territorial incursions, and Hong Soon-chil, who led a volunteer civilian guard to protect the islands in the chaotic aftermath of the Korean War.

By framing the dispute through the eyes of the mincho (the common people), the AI lyrics create a direct lineage between these historical “volunteers” and the modern digital user. The message is clear: when the state’s diplomacy is perceived as too cautious, it is the ordinary Korean who must stand guard. This is the essence of grassroots politics of memory: the democratization of memory, where the “truth” is protected not by treaties, but by a collective, algorithmic “flow” that refuses to be silenced.

The AI’s lyrical scope also extends beyond the rocks themselves. Several tracks tackle broader “history wars,” criticizing Japan’s controversial textbook revisions and the visits of Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines war criminals. By linking Dokdo to these larger issues of historical justice, the AI songs ensure that the territorial dispute remains inseparable from the broader demand for a “correct” reckoning with the past.

The emergence of AI-driven digital nationalism carries profound implications for East Asian stability. As for now, it’s just one channel, but it can be expected more AI-generated videos would be created. This phenomenon represents a significant shift in Korean collective identity. By democratizing the production of high-quality propaganda, AI can effectively take the monopoly on national memory away from the state and hand it to the Internet. 

It could also change the relationship between voters and politicians. For a South Korean decision-maker, appearing “soft” on Dokdo is a perennial career-killer; now, that pressure is amplified by a 24/7 AI-generated soundtracks that frame any silence as a strategic defeat.

Furthermore, the “DokdoKorea” strategy exploits the inherent biases of social media algorithms. Platforms like TikTok prioritize high-engagement, emotionally charged content. A dry historical debate doesn’t trend; but a K-pop song with an “us-versus-them” narrative does. For Japan, this presents a “Whac-A-Mole” dilemma: how and if do you counter a decentralized, anonymous AI that can generate a dozen new songs for every one formal protest issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

The case is more than a quirky collision of high-tech and high-tension nationalism in East Asia. It might be a harbinger of a new era, where the ability to automate the cultural and historical legitimacy of a territory becomes a primary tool of non-state actors. As AI tools for music, video, and lyric generation become more sophisticated and accessible, this model is likely to be exported to other contested territories and historical disputes. In this environment, a single viral “song” can do more to cement a territorial claim in the minds of the younger generation than school lessons.

Satellite imagery has revealed that North Korea and Russia are scrambling to complete a new high-capacity road bridge across their Tumen River border, and experts told Radio Free Asia that the fervor for completing the project quickly is a sign of increased cooperation and warm relations between Pyongyang and Moscow.

Until now, the only bridge connecting the two countries has been the Bridge of Friendship, a much smaller rail-only bridge that was built in 1959 and had been intended to be a temporary measure until a permanent bridge could be built. That never happened, until now.

The new bridge, set to open next month, will be capable of handling up to 300 vehicles, and transporting 2,850 people across the border per day, according to Russia’s Ministry of Transport. It spans about a kilometer (3,280 feet) long and will connect the North Korean city of Rason, with the Russian town of Khasan.

“It appears both sides are pushing hard to complete the final construction in time for the official opening scheduled for this summer,” Bruce Songhak Chung, a senior researcher at the Seoul-based Korea Institute for Security Strategy, told RFA. “The project is showing approximately 80% to 90% completion ahead of the official opening.”

Satellite images from March 10, April 22, and May 16, show the progression of construction on a customs building on the North Korean side. Roofing work is now finished, and ground leveling and paving around the building have progressed significantly, Chung said. Paving work on access roads linking the customs facility is also in its final stages, he said.

On the Russian side, construction of a large-scale customs complex has advanced rapidly. Satellite images from February and April show that building construction with concrete work, access road paving, and site clearing had all moved forward considerably. A small checkpoint building to inspect vehicles before the bridge is also under construction.

June grand opening

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to build the new bridge at a summit in Pyongyang in June 2024. Since then both governments have held events to commemorate its progress.

A groundbreaking ceremony occurred in April 2025, and on April 21 this year, delegations from both countries virtually participated in a bridge connection ceremony.

On the same day as the connection ceremony, the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang announced that the bridge would be completed on June 19 — six months ahead of its original completion date.

Experts suggest the year-round road crossing will further develop trade, economic, and people-to-people ties between the Russian Far East and North Korea.

Moscow and Pyongyang rapidly increased trade and cooperation following Russia’s isolation from the international community following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since then, the two countries have ramped up trade and cooperation, with North Korea even sending weapons and soldiers to fight on the Russian side.

Military and economic cooperation will only improve once the new bridge is completed, Joung Eunlee, the director of the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification, told RFA.

“Road transport can move larger volumes of freight more quickly than rail and allow more people to travel, so bilateral trade is expected to grow once the bridge opens,” she said.

North Korea could also use the bridge to more aggressively deploy overseas workers to Russia, Kang Dong Wan, a professor of political science at Dong-A University in Busan, South Korea, told RFA.

The cash-strapped North Korean government routinely skirts sanctions by sending legions of workers overseas to earn foreign wages, then confiscates most of it.

The new bridge would further erode the effectiveness of sanctions, experts warned.

Tumen Bridge vs. Yalu Bridge (A barometer of relations)

The rapid progress on the Tumen River Bridge stands in sharp contrast to the New Yalu River Bridge between North Korea and China, which was structurally completed in 2014, but has not yet opened because completion of infrastructure on the North Korean side has stalled.

It was built as a symbol of North Korea-China economic cooperation, with China providing active investment.

Recent satellite imagery of that bridge shows construction of customs facilities in North Korea have made considerable progress, but some areas still have empty lots and construction materials, Chung said.

Analysts say the diverging fates of the two bridges reflect Kim Jong Un’s strategic tilt toward Moscow over Beijing.

North Korea has been less than enthusiastic about opening the New Yalu River Bridge because it fears increased Chinese interference and influence, Andrei Lankov, a Russia-born North Korea expert and professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, previously told RFA.

Kim Jong Un has blocked the completion of that bridge to stop Chinese-style reform from flowing in and destabilizing the existing power structures in North Korea, Ri Jong Ho, a former senior North Korean official, who defected to South Korea in 2014 and currently lives in Virginia, told RFA.

“The New Yalu River Bridge has become a barometer of North Korea-China relations. It could open within months depending on Kim Jong Un’s decision — or it could take another decade, or remain closed beyond the Kim Jong Un era,” Ri said.

The rapid push to complete the Tumen River road bridge reflects Kim’s judgment that cooperation with Russia is far safer and more advantageous than with China, Ri said.

Edited by Eugene Whong.

Tehran – Freight train traffic between China and Iran has accelerated sharply since the start of a US naval blockade in the Persian Gulf, underscoring Tehran’s widening shift toward overland trade corridors as neighbouring countries move to facilitate Iranian commerce despite Western pressure.

Cargo trains travelling from Xi‘an in central China to Tehran have increased from roughly one train per week before the conflict to one every three to four days since the blockade began on April 13, according to a Bloomberg report. The route through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan has emerged as a critical artery in Tehran’s effort to offset maritime disruptions and maintain trade flows.

The increase in rail traffic comes as Iraq issued a direct order to customs authorities across the country requiring the activation of transit and transshipment operations for Iranian goods through Iraqi territory, expanding Tehran’s access to alternative trade routes.

Under directives from Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s government, customs offices across northern, central, western and southern Iraq, as well as air cargo facilities and Baghdad International Airport, have been instructed to facilitate the transit and reloading of Iranian goods.

The move effectively integrates Iraq’s land and air transport infrastructure into Iran’s transit network at a time when Tehran faces mounting pressure from a maritime blockade intended to isolate its economy.

The US-led naval restrictions, imposed during the wider regional conflict involving Iran, Israel and allied Gulf states, were designed to inflict economic pressure by constraining Iranian shipping and energy exports. However, rather than cutting Iran off, the measures appear to have accelerated Tehran’s transition toward land-based supply chains and regional transport networks.

Iran’s strategic geographic position between Asia, the Middle East and Eurasia has enabled it to redirect cargo toward overland corridors connecting China, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Turkey and Russia.

According to data from the Islamic Republic of Iran Railways, more than 40 freight trains from China have entered Iran since the beginning of this year. That compares with just seven trains operating on the route during the previous seven years combined, signalling a dramatic acceleration in rail-based trade.

The China-Iran rail corridor runs through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, keeping cargo traffic far from maritime routes vulnerable to naval restrictions. Analysts say direct interference with such land networks could risk broader geopolitical consequences involving Beijing.

The rail expansion forms part of a longer-term strategy pursued by Tehran to reduce exposure to sanctions and external pressure by building logistical partnerships with regional and international allies.

In October, Iran began exporting diesel by rail to Afghanistan through the 225-km Khaf-Herat rail line connecting Iran’s northeastern Khorasan Razavi province to Herat.

Earlier, China launched a direct freight rail service to Hairatan in northern Afghanistan, while Uzbekistan and Afghanistan later announced plans to extend rail connectivity to Herat, approximately 130 km from the Iranian border.

Iran has also committed billions of dollars to develop a North-South transportation corridor linking the country with Russia, part of broader efforts to diversify commercial routes.

Kambiz Etemadi, head of the container committee of Iran’s national shipping association, said Iran could shift as much as 40% of its conventional maritime trade toward overland transport systems.

On Friday, Iran launched the operational phase of the Sarakhs Economic Zone in Khorasan Razavi province near the Turkmenistan border in another effort to strengthen trade connectivity with China and Central Asia.

The free zone possesses annual cargo handling capacity of 10 million tonnes but currently processes only around 2.8 million tonnes.

Rasoul Rais Jafari, chief executive of the Sarakhs Free Zone Organization, said previous traffic constraints stemmed partly from a lack of return cargo to China. He said exports of zinc and copper concentrates are expected to create return loads that could make rail transportation economically more competitive than maritime shipping.

According to Iranian officials, Sarakhs possesses infrastructure supporting both broad-gauge and standard-gauge railway systems and can process up to 1,000 waggons daily in cooperation with a Chinese logistics company.

The project follows three decades of development and aligns with broader Iran-China cooperation under the two countries’ 25-year strategic partnership agreement.

Sarakhs also forms part of the 925-km Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway network inaugurated in 2014 by the leaders of the three countries, with annual freight capacity estimated at between three and five million tonnes.

Turkey is also being considered as a potential alternative trade gateway. Turkish infrastructure already functions as a major logistics platform for imports, manufacturing and transit operations, and Iranian officials have suggested portions of trade traditionally routed through the United Arab Emirates could be redirected there.

Beyond China and Turkey, Tehran has sought to deepen commercial integration with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) through a preferential trade framework under which tariffs on approximately 88% of Iranian commodity groups have been eliminated.

Iranian officials describe the arrangement as giving Tehran an advantage not available to other regional players such as Turkey and China.

Iran currently maintains a trade volume of roughly $25 billion with the UAE, including $15 billion in imports and $10 billion in exports. Officials say a large proportion of imported goods are re-exported products originating elsewhere, creating opportunities to diversify sourcing channels.

Iranian economic studies suggest trade with EAEU member states could increase from approximately $5 billion currently to $15 billion over the next two to three years.

Iranian officials say the expansion of transport and trade corridors demonstrates that efforts to economically isolate the country may instead be strengthening its role as a strategic transit bridge linking East and West.

Analysts say whether these alternative routes can permanently replace maritime commerce remains uncertain, but recent developments suggest Tehran’s regional connectivity strategy has gained renewed urgency under geopolitical pressure.

Ten years ago, when Salma Arif became one of the city’s youngest councillors, she sat down with Asian Express and spoke about growing up in Harehills with honesty, pride and deep affection for the community that shaped her.

“I am the product of Harehills,” she said back then. This week, those words feel more powerful than ever.

Because the girl from Harehills who once wondered whether people like her truly belonged in politics has just made history – becoming the first Muslim Deputy Leader of Leeds City Council.

And at a time when British Muslims are increasingly facing hostility, suspicion and toxic public rhetoric, her appointment feels about far more than politics.

For many across Yorkshire’s Muslim communities, her appointment feels bigger than politics. It feels personal.

Salma’s story has never been one of polished political ambition or carefully manufactured image. It is rooted in family, identity and community – in the everyday realities of Leeds life that so many people across Yorkshire instantly recognise.

Her forefathers arrived in Leeds in the 1930s after serving with British Forces during the Second World War. Like thousands of immigrants who helped rebuild Britain, they came searching for opportunity, stability and a future for the generations that would follow.

Back then, they could never have imagined that one day their granddaughter would help lead one of the UK’s biggest cities.

But this week, she did exactly that.

In a deeply personal statement shared following her appointment, Salma reflected on that journey.

“Never in a million years would young me from Harehills have believed this was possible,” Salma wrote. I hope young people across our communities can look at this and know that where you come from should never limit where you can go.”

She added: “My forefathers, who first arrived in Leeds in the 1930s, would never have deemed it possible that one of their own would one day hold this position.”

There is something deeply relatable about the way she speaks. No political slogans. No performance.

Just gratitude, disbelief and a very real understanding of what this moment means – particularly for communities who often feel overlooked, talked about rather than listened to, and visible only when headlines turn negative.

Since first being elected in 2016 with one of the city’s largest majorities, she has built a reputation as a grounded, community-focused politician who remained closely connected to the realities of inner-city Leeds long after entering civic office.

Over the years, she has become one of the city’s most recognisable voices on inequality, youth opportunity, public health and community cohesion.

She has spoken openly about poverty in Harehills during the cost-of-living crisis, warning families were reaching breaking point as food bank queues stretched for hours.

She has championed accessible sport, culture and community investment, including backing major regeneration projects and sports facilities designed to create opportunities for young people in underserved areas.

And during some of Leeds’ most difficult moments – including last year’s disorder in Harehills – she was among the local figures publicly urging calm, working to reassure residents and protect community relations as tensions escalated.

But perhaps most significantly, Salma’s rise comes at a time when many British Muslims feel increasingly alienated from political discourse altogether.

Across the UK, concerns around Islamophobia, online hate, far-right rhetoric and hostile public narratives have intensified in recent years. Muslim politicians, particularly women, have frequently found themselves subjected to abuse simply for existing visibly in public life.

Against that backdrop, Salma Arif’s appointment carries symbolic weight far beyond Leeds Civic Hall.

It is a reminder that representation matters – not as tokenism, but as proof that British institutions still have the capacity to reflect the communities they serve.

Perhaps that is why this moment feels so significant.

“Growing up in Harehills shaped who I am,” Salma said this week.

“It taught me resilience, compassion and the importance of fighting for people whose voices are too often overlooked.

“To now be in a position to help lead the city I love is something I will never take for granted.”