Unlike President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, Indonesia’s new president, Prabowo Subianto, has yet to introduce a coherent national maritime strategy. In fact, following his inauguration in October, Prabowo began his administration by dissolving one of Jokowi’s main maritime legacies: the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment (Marves).
Established during Jokowi’s second term in 2019, Marves was crucial for harmonizing the country’s approach to maritime affairs, particularly in light of clashing personalities and public feuds between ministers. One example of this was the dispute between Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries Susi Pudjiastuti and Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, the coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment, over issues such as sustainable fishing and the combative stance that Susi took against foreign fishing vessels.
Marves reflected Jokowi’s ad hoc approach to difficult issues, such as entrenched maritime interests, and his administration relied on strong ministers like Luhut, appointed the first coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment in 2019, who could restrain other actors from undermining the key national priorities set by Jokowi. Furthermore, Marves embodied Jokowi’s maritime outlook, which emphasized a tight nexus between the security and economic domains, albeit with economic priorities often taking priority over security interests, particularly in relation to key partners such as China. Thus, the dissolution of Marves should be seen as a significant departure from this approach by Prabowo, particularly in terms of his approach to the connection between economic and security issues.
How, then, should we interpret Indonesia’s approach to maritime issues under Prabowo?
The Domestic Politics Behind Maritime Strategy
As the largest archipelagic country in the world, maritime affairs are not only a vital resource for Indonesia’s prosperity and security but also an important aspect of the country’s national identity. Nearly all Indonesian presidents have given institutional attention to maritime governance in one form or another.
Under the country’s first president, Sukarno, Indonesia first introduced the archipelagic concept through the Djuanda Declaration, which aimed not only to create a geographic unity within the borders of the former Dutch East Indies but also, sought to foster national cohesion through a shared maritime identity. The declaration was initially designed to address postwar domestic security challenges by limiting foreign warships’ access to its internal waters to prevent them from organizing unauthorized military exercises or supporting internal rebellions across the archipelago.
During Suharto’s era (1966-1998), the Declaration was implemented by aligning it with the evolving internal legal regime under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982. This allowed Indonesia to advance its agenda of being recognized as an archipelagic state, fulfilling its desire to bolster regime security in response to threats posed by its porous maritime borders.
However, as the international understanding of the seas evolved with UNCLOS, which recognized not only territorial seas but also sovereign rights over exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and continental shelves, Indonesia sought to reflect these developments by expanding its maritime agencies. This expansion has not only complicated Indonesia’s border disputes with its neighbors but also, has led to the creation of competing maritime agencies within Indonesia itself, setting the context for attempts to impose coordination.
Given its unique geography, maritime affairs governance has always been complicated for Indonesia. Maritime affairs are handled by many domestic institutions. For instance, more than five ministries are involved in maritime issues, including the ministries of energy and tourism, marine affairs and fisheries, and transportation. Indonesia also has more than 10 institutions with maritime law enforcement capacity, including the police, navy, transportation authorities, customs, and others.
After Reformasi, in 1999, Abdurrahman Wahid established the Indonesia Maritime Councils and the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. Under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the former was renamed the Indonesia Marine Council. Although the Council was dissolved under Jokowi, it was largely replaced by Marves.
Jokowi’s Maritime Legacy
During his presidency, Jokowi’s primary focus was on the economy, and he sought to integrate the maritime agenda into Indonesia’s economic development through investment. He introduced the “maritime highway” concept to address the inequalities between the various Indonesian islands. Jokowi also consolidated all maritime policy under the Global Maritime Fulcrum strategy, which he introduced during his first term campaign.
Although the Global Maritime Fulcrum faced many criticisms, Jokowi laid some important foundations for Indonesia’s maritime governance. One example is the establishment of Indonesia’s National Ocean Policy, which integrates key strategies for maritime affairs, including security, the blue economy, and institutional governance. More specifically, under Jokowi, Indonesia also published the White Book on Maritime Diplomacy to elevate the importance of maritime affairs in Indonesia’s diplomatic strategy.
Furthermore, in response to the complexity of maritime governance institutions, Jokowi established two coordinating bodies: the Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs and the Indonesian Coast Guard (BAKAMLA). These institutions are crucial not only for coordinating various maritime-related issues but also, for following up on the targets set by Indonesia’s National Ocean Policy.
In the last decade, under Jokowi and Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, Indonesia has demonstrated important leadership in the region, particularly in maritime affairs. Notable examples include Indonesia’s leading role in the formulation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which has a strong maritime cooperation component, and the ASEAN Maritime Outlook, a document introduced during Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2023.
Waiting for Prabowo’s National Maritime Strategy
During his tenure as Minister of Defense (2019-2024), Prabowo initiated a comprehensive naval modernization program. This aimed to enhance Indonesia’s power projection capability by procuring cutting-edge naval equipment, notably from Western countries such as France and Italy.
However, this desire to modernize naval equipment has yet to be translated into a coherent national maritime agenda, leaving each agency to focus on their respective priorities – such as the Foreign Ministry concentrating on boundary delimitation and the Defense Ministry on weapons procurement – absent active intervention from the top.
The joint statements released after Prabowo’s recent visits to countries including China, India, and the United Kingdom, featured maritime cooperation, including sustainable fishing, maritime security, and safety. However, this has been done without efforts to produce national guidelines or without close consultation with key institutions.
The absence of a coherent national maritime doctrine and coordinated efforts, and a top-down, personalized approach to policymaking by President Prabowo in the maritime domain including the South China Sea could lead to confusion and contradictions in Indonesia’s approach. One such intervention was exemplified in the controversial 2024 Joint Statement with China, where Indonesia recognized an “overlapping claim” with China for the first time. This policy contradicted Indonesia’s long-held position that it is a non-claimant in the South China Sea and complicated the country’s efforts, particularly those of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to challenge China’s historical claims.
Furthermore, Prabowo’s absence of a maritime strategy could have significant consequences in two key areas.
First, it could undermine and complicate efforts to coordinate maritime-related institutions. With so many diverse institutions dealing with maritime affairs, each often has its own priorities and agendas. Therefore, to avoid overlap and ensure coordination, Indonesia needs coordinating institutions. The overlapping authority at sea may also have economic consequences. For instance, the business community has long complained about the cost of maritime inspections for merchant ships.
One reason for this is the existence of several law enforcement agencies that claim the authority to inspect foreign ships under various Indonesian laws. These overlaps have created confusion and inefficiency in maritime inspections. As a result, merchant vessels often complain about the additional costs caused by inspections from multiple institutions.
Second, it could undermine efforts to establish a coherent response to rising powers that does not compromise Indonesia’s interests in various sectors. In the example mentioned earlier, Prabowo’s focus on economic and regional security undermined the longstanding foreign policy approach espoused by the Foreign Ministry, which could have been avoided through closer coordination between them.
Therefore, it is crucial for Prabowo, who is committed to continuing Jokowi’s maritime legacy, to develop a strategy that not only builds upon his predecessor’s achievements but also articulates his own vision for advancing Indonesia’s maritime affairs. Indonesia must first establish a clear strategy and assessment of the overall challenges in maritime affairs, encompassing both traditional and non-traditional security issues. With this clarity, Indonesia can allocate resources more effectively to address these challenges. Without such assessments and a coherent strategy, simply increasing procurement will likely fall short in addressing the nation’s maritime challenges.
This article is part of a series of commentaries sharing findings from the project on Indonesia’s Evolving Maritime Strategy, jointly led by Emirza Adi Syailendra and Evelyn Goh at The Australian National University. While this commentary has benefited from feedback from the co-investigator, Syailendra, the views expressed are solely those of the author.
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