Weapons Systems Failures May Have Led to Personnel Removals

Weapons Systems Failures May Have Led to Personnel Removals

Executive Summary:

• The Iran war has exposed a widening gap between Beijing’s claims of military-technological superiority and the apparent battlefield performance of air defense and counter-drone warfare systems linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
• PRC state media has amplified Iranian disinformation and shifted attention to supposed U.S. strategic weaknesses, rather than confront failures in Iran’s air-defense response to U.S. and Israeli strikes.
• The unexplained removal of multiple defense-linked academicians from the rosters of top scientific institutions has fueled suspicion that failures in overseas battlefield performance may be intersecting with deeper problems of accountability and effectiveness in the PRC defense-industrial system.

On April 5–6, state media in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reported that the second crew member from a U.S. F-15E shot down over Iran had been rescued, but only after what Xinhua described as a U.S. mission that nearly suffered “catastrophic losses” (灾难性损失) (Xinhua, April 6). The story allowed Beijing to imply that Iran’s air defenses were still capable of exacting a price, continuing a tendency in official discourse to amplify isolated Iranian successes rather than confront what the broader collapse of Iran’s air-defense network may reveal about the battlefield credibility of PRC-linked military technology. [1]

State Media Amplifies Iranian Disinformation

At the start of the war in early March, PRC outlets did not report at all on Iranian losses of air-defense radars, choosing instead to cite content from Iranian official and pro-regime information channels. This included social-media-amplified claims stating that U.S. radar sites in Gulf states had been devastated by Iranian missiles and Shahed drones (CCTV, March 2, March 9; Xinhua, March 10, March 24). [2] A typical example came on February 28. Citing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Xinhua claimed that a U.S. radar in Qatar, used to track ballistic missiles and with a detection range of 5,000 kilometers, had been “completely destroyed” (彻底摧毁) (Xinhua, February 28). But the accompanying images were plainly AI-generated (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Example of AI-Generated Disinformation Spread by Pro–Islamic Republic Social Media Accounts

(Source: X/@Tehran Times)

As the war progressed, Beijing repeatedly cited claims from Tehran that U.S. aircraft had been shot down or damaged—most of them disinformation—as if Iran’s air-defense network were still exerting a meaningful deterrent effect on U.S. airpower (Xinhua, March 28, April 3). Even when Iran did genuinely bring down an F-15E aircraft, some influential civilian military and political commentators with ties to Beijing even circulated exaggerated footage from video game Arma 3 as if it were real video of a U.S. aircraft being shot down (Weibo/@Simapingbang, April 4).

As U.S. and Israeli tactical successes belied Iran’s claimed battlefield achievements, Beijing shifted attention to what it portrayed as America’s looming strategic failure in the face of a possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In a series of reports, Beijing emphasized that the United States had failed to achieve its war aims and was instead facing a dilemma of being eager to extricate itself from the conflict but unwilling to escalate. Xinhua cited PRC scholars as saying that “not a single U.S. war objective has been achieved” (战争目标一个都没实现), arguing that Washington’s simultaneous push for a ceasefire and continued troop deployments suggested it “has not made the strategic decision” (没有下战略上的决心) (Xinhua, March 27). Reporting repeatedly magnified the strategic pressure posed by the Strait of Hormuz, warning that the United States could once again “sink into a war quagmire” (深陷战争泥潭) if it attempted coastal assaults or limited ground operations to reopen the waterway (Xinhua, March 27; Qilu Evening News, March 28).

Weapons Experts Removed From Academy Websites

Apparent personnel changes at leading defense research institutions suggest that Beijing’s public information strategy is in part an attempt to deflect from the tactical success of U.S. and Israeli strikes carried out by weapons platforms it regards as outdated. Such an admission would cast doubt on its self-image of a pioneer of cutting-edge technology and the broad narrative of “the East is rising, the West is declining” (东升西降) (Xinhua, June 30, 2023).

The website of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE; 中国工程院) recently removed three names from its “List of Academicians” (院士名单). Although the individual profile pages of Wu Manqing (吴曼青), Wei Yiyin (魏毅寅), and Zhao Xiangeng (赵宪庚) remain accessible, their names no longer appear among the 988 members on the public roster (CAE, accessed March 23). Earlier reporting on Wu described him as an “expert with outstanding contributions to the national defense science and technology industry sector” (国防科技工业有突出贡献专家), noting that he had “independently developed digital array technology and driven continuous innovation in radar system design” (自主创新了数字阵列技术，推动雷达体制的持续创新) (Global Times, June 13, 2022). The other two are likewise specialists from the defense-industrial sector.

According to the CAE’s charter, academician status is a lifetime honor and may be revoked only under three circumstances: serious academic misconduct, conviction for a criminal offense, or voluntary relinquishment at the individual’s request (CAE, accessed March 23). Authorities have not explained why the qualifications of these three academicians were withdrawn, but public speculation has increasingly linked the change to the overseas battlefield performance of PRC platforms (Mnews, March 19).

The Chinese Academy of Sciences (中国科学院) similarly removed two academicians from its roster, again without any official explanation (Zaobao, March 20). Liu Guozhi (刘国治), an expert in high-power microwave technology, and Liu Wei (刘伟), chief designer of the J-20 fighter, were both defense experts. Of the two, Liu Guozhi’s field is more directly relevant to the export of the advanced weapons Beijing claims to possess. At last year’s September 3 military parade, Beijing prominently declared that weapons based on high-power microwave technology constituted one of the “powerful three iron pillars” (强大铁三角) of counter-drone warfare, alongside counter-drone gun-and-missile systems and high-energy laser weapons (Xinhua, September 3, 2025).

The only PRC-exported counter-drone system publicly confirmed to have reached Iran is the Shen Nong Shield 3000 (神农盾3000) high-energy laser weapon, though the country may also have acquired a high-power microwave counter-drone weapon. A leaked product brochure by defense giant Norinco (北方工业集团) at the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow stated that such a system had been approved for export (see Figure 2) (TWZ, October 7, 2024). The buyer was not disclosed, but some within PRC military enthusiast communities have speculated that if high-energy laser weapons were exported to Iran to counter Israeli drones, then this high-power microwave weapon was highly likely to have been exported to Iran too (Sohu Blog/@Dizhang Tanbing, October 15, 2024). [3] The IRGC, with its penchant for exaggeration, is unlikely to have remained quiet if it had successfully deployed PRC-exported counter-drone systems. The fact that it did not claim to have downed U.S. and Israeli drones until April 5 could indicate deficiencies in the equipment at its disposal (Reuters, April 5). In that context, Liu Guozhi’s apparent removal has likewise fueled suspicion about the effectiveness of PRC counter-drone platforms.

Figure 2. Leaked Page of Product Brochure for a High-Power Microwave Counter-Drone Weapon

(Source: Author research)

Conclusion

The Iran war has revealed a widening gap between Beijing’s rhetoric and the apparent battlefield performance of PRC-linked military technology. Official silence, reliance on Iranian claims, and unusual personnel changes in the PRC’s defense-scientific establishment all undermine the credibility of Beijing’s carefully cultivated claims to military-technological superiority.

Notes

[1] U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that the aircraft had been shot down by a shoulder-fired missile (Times of Israel, April 6).

[2] This followed a pattern observed after last year’s Operation Midnight Hammer, in which state media largely confined itself to relaying messages from Tehran, some of them obviously false (China Brief Notes, June 27, 2025).

[3] Based on a review of past PRC arms-export records, when the buyer has been a Middle Eastern political entity not hostile to the United States, such as the UAE or Egypt, the purchaser’s identity has usually been disclosed openly. By contrast, when the buyer is more politically sensitive, as in the case of Iran, information about the end user has often been left deliberately vague.