Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to be desperate to find ways to break the shackles of diplomatic isolation that have gradually stifled the Russian economy despite continuous manipulation of the open and unregulated energy market through the price lever.
In his unusual year-end virtual meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping through video link on Monday 30 December, he appeared to be abnormally infatuated with Xi and went much against his trademark arrogance to appease his Chinese counterpart.
“We are expecting you, dear Mr Chairman, dear friend, we are expecting you next spring on a state visit to Moscow. This will demonstrate to the whole world the strength of Russian-Chinese ties on key issues,” is how Putin tried to exhibit his “extraordinary fondness” for Xi.
This is in stark contrast to the signature superciliousness of Putin, who is infamous for bullying world leaders during diplomatic interactions through his verbal and non-verbal communication.
Keeping others waiting for him by showing up late at scheduled sessions, using extremely long tables for bilateral meetings to symbolise “distance”, bringing his favourite dog to official meetings and paying more attention to his pet than the guests as a gesture of intimidation are some of the methods that he has employed in the past to register his haughtiness.
However, it appears the Ukraine war and its economic and political implications have compelled him to go the extra mile to lure Xi. But Xi’s response to Putin’s conviviality was rather lukewarm. He rather bluntly told his Russian counterpart that the road to peace talks on Ukraine would not be smooth and that China would continue to uphold its “objective and fair stance” on the issue.
Yes, Xi showed willingness for close coordination between Beijing and Moscow in international affairs and offered to facilitate Russia’s willingness to engage in negotiations over Ukraine, but he desisted from backing Putin in his Ukraine misadventure in clear terms.
“You and I share the same views on the causes, course and logic of the ongoing transformation of the global geopolitical landscape, in the face of unprecedented pressure and provocations from the West,” Putin told Xi in their video conference while offering full support to China on the Taiwan issue as well as hoping to boost the military ties between China and Russia.
Interestingly, though Xi expressed his readiness to increase strategic cooperation with Russia in what he called a “difficult” situation in the global arena, he did not mention any plan for increased military collaboration. Interestingly, both of them had signed a “no limits” strategic partnership in February last year, induced by shared distrust of the West, a few days before Russian troops trespassed into Ukrainian territory in what Putin terms a “special military operation”.
Indubitably, China is perceived as the most crucial ally of Russia in the Ukraine war. However, during the last 10 months, we have witnessed many confusing and rather contradictory adjustments in China’s stance. Instead of voting in favour of Russia, China preferred to abstain from the UN security council and general assembly resolutions in March last year.
Similarly, with regard to sanctions on Russia, China has been showing reasonable compliance with the rest of the world. Rumours are rife that China was aware of the impending Ukraine invasion in February 2022 because Russia waited for the culmination of the Beijing winter Olympics before sending troops across the border.
From the onset of the Ukraine invasion, China has verbally pledged support to Russia. But recent events seem to show that China is now pulling back slightly from this posture. Is there a change of heart? The answer, partly, is yes.
A Russian victory is not what China wants or expects. Russia’s victory will certainly embolden Putin — who is currently playing the role of junior partner in Xi’s anti-West efforts — to reclaim an assertive role in the global power structure. In the event of a Russian victory, the country would eventually emerge considerably stronger than it was before launching the invasion, and would entice Putin into thinking about what it would take to create a new Soviet Union.
A stronger Russian federation — and Putin — will certainly reduce the chances of playing second fiddle. In that case, Putin would prefer to pursue his own high-octane power agenda and project Russia as an equal player — to the US and China — in a new tri-polar power setup, rather than keep posing as the ally of China. A strong, resurgent Putin would certainly be a grubby scenario for the Chinese in the long run as it would be very difficult for Beijing to keep Putin from pursuing his ambitious agenda. Putin would be free to manoeuvre as per his whims and may even directly hurt Chinese interests.
This is what Xi and his colleagues would not like to happen. Historically, Russia and China have always been traditional adversaries and have been involved in confrontations on different issues. The recent love affair between the two is the result of the circumstantial convergence of their mutual anti-US and anti-West thrust amid the swiftly evolving global power equation.
Ostensibly, Russia’s defeat at the end of a prolonged war of aggression in Ukraine is what serves Chinese interests at this point. Russia will have no choice but to become a permanent junior partner in China’s global agenda. An acutely debilitated Russia, severed from the West, would be compelled to tag along with China in the form of a meek ally.
For Beijing, the only possible negative fallout of Russia’s defeat could be the ascension of a pro-West regime in Moscow. But this is a very remote possibility. Yes, a defeat in Ukraine will drastically lessen Putin’s power and an internal revolt can’t be ruled out.
However, Putin has very few rivals in the United Russia party or any opposition parties who can challenge him at the moment. At the same time, there is no prominent pro-West pressure group in Russia with enough potential to overthrow him.
The two most prominent Russian opposition parties — Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s far-right party and the Communists — cannot be classified as pro-Western at all. Putin is also not likely to leave the stage calmly in case of a defeat. A “wounded” Putin may become more aggressive and reactive to save his own base at home by pre-empting any possible move by the insiders.
That’s why the Chinese are treading very carefully with regard to the Ukraine episode and keeping their cards close to their chests. China apparently doesn’t want Russia to emerge as a tangible winner from this imbroglio because a victorious Russia will become inordinately assertive and it would be difficult for Beijing to manage it, whereas a routed and sequestered Russia would have only one option — accept China as a big brother and play the role of junior partner. Perhaps this is what the Chinese are expecting at the end of the Ukraine episode.
Nonetheless, the recent virtual meeting between Putin and Xi reflects growing anxiety on both sides: Putin is certainly on the back foot after a series of military fiascos in Ukraine and wants to bolster his position by projecting “closeness” with Beijing. Xi is also facing a tough time on the home front after abandoning his stringent zero Covid policy which has resulted in a massive resurgence of the pandemic and an unprecedented wave of protests against his containment policy.
Dr Imran Khalid is a freelance columnist on international affairs based in Karachi, Pakistan. He qualified as a physician from Dow Medical University in 1991 and has a master’s degree in international relations from Karachi University.
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